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STATE OF IDAHO 
KRYSTAL M. KINGHORN 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
Vs 




BANK OF COMMERCE 
Defendant/Respondent 
App~Jed from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial 
Distrittof the State of Idaho, in and For Fremont County 
Honorable Gregory W. Moeller District Judge 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Iq~ho Falls, ID 83405 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
Alan F. Johnston, Esq. 
PO Box 2949 
Idaho Falls, ID 83403 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
Bradley J. Dixon, Esq. 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Suite 1900 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorney for Defendant/CrossClaimant/Respondent 
Douglas R. Nelson, Esq. 
PO Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent 
n. On December 20, 2008, BRP paid 2007 real property taxes on the subject 
property in the amount of $52.56. Kelly Clay has agreed to reimburse BRP for this amount. 
o. On December 20, 2008, BRP paid 2008 real property taxes on the subject 
property in the amount of $169.60. Kelly Clay has agreed to reimburse BRP for this amount. 
p. On December 20, 2008, BRP paid 2008 real property taxes on the subject 
property in the amount of $82.32. Kelly Clay has agreed to reimburse BRP for this amount. 
q. On January 20, 2009, BRP paid a past due subdivision road fee in the 
amount of $50.00 and a past due subdivision water fee of $70.00 on the subject property. On 
this date, BRP also paid a 2008 or 2009 subdivision road fee in the amount of $75.00 and a 2008 
or 2009 water fee of $1 05.00 on the subject property. Kelly Clay has agreed to reimburse BRP 
for this amount. 
r. On March 23, 2009, Kelly Clay paid 2008 mobile home property taxes on 
the subject property in the amount of$140.84. 
In summary, Kelly Clay has paid the Bank of Commerce $19,820.75 and $846.40 in 
property taxes. BRP has paid $556.35 in property taxes, $141 in insurance, $200 in subdivision 
road fees, and $280 in subdivision water fees. Kelly Clay has agreed to reimburse BRP for the 
property taxes, insurance, road fees, and water fees BRP has paid and such payments shall be 
treated as though Kelly Clay has paid these items for purposes of this stipulation. I Thus, it is 
undisputed that Kelly Clay has paid $21,844.50 in connection with the property in dispute in this 
action. The amounts Kelly Clay paid in conjunction with the property were all for taxes, 
insurance, and other assessments for which he is entitled to receive reimbursement from Krystal 
Kinghorn. 
2009. 
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III. ALLOWING KINGHORN TO PURCHASE OR REDEEM THE PROPERTY 
WITHOUT REIMBURSING CLAY FOR THE COSTS AND INTEREST 
ASSOCIA TED WITH THE LOAN GUARANTEE AGREEMENT WOULD BE 
UNJUST. 
Idaho courts have held that in computing the amount of a deficiency judgment the court 
should allow accrued interest "on the total amount of the mortgage indebtedness, including 
foreclosure costs and attorney fees ... at the statutory rate." Thompson v. Kirsch, 106 Idaho 177, 
183 (Id. App.1984). Courts have held that the language ofLC. § 45-1512 "reasonably implies 
that the judgment to be entered may include interest accrued from the date of sale, costs of sale 
and attorney fees." Farber v. Howell, 111 Idaho 132, 135 (Id. App. 1986). The court in 
Thompson computed the interest allowable in that foreclosure proceeding according to Idaho 
Code Section 28-22-104, which is currently twelve percent per year. Thompson at 183. Idaho 
Code Section 28-22-104 (1) states that "[wJhen there is no express contract in writing fixing a 
different rate of interest, interest is allowed at the rate of twelve cents (12¢) on the hundred by 
the year on ... [m Joney lent." Further, courts dealing with the issue of foreclosure have described 
unjust enrichment as consisting "of three elements: (1) there was a benefit conferred upon the 
defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant of such benefit; and (3) acceptance 
of the benefit under circumstances that would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the 
benefit without payment to the plaintiff for the value thereof.". Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 
144 Idaho 547, 558 (2007). 
As detailed above, Clay has paid $21,844.50 in conjunction with the property at issue in 
this case. Essentially, Clay has given Kinghorn an interest free loan by paying the bank, taxes, 
insurance, and water and road fees associated with the property. Kinghorn has received a benefit 
as Clay has paid various expenses in connection with the property that is to be conveyed back to 
Kinghorn. Allowing Kinghorn to purchase the property without reimbursing Clay for the 
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amounts he has spent would be unjust. This injustice is even greater when one considers that 
Clay had was doing Kinghorn a favor by helping her get the loan. Kinghorn breached the Loan 
Guarantee Agreement by defaulting on the loan which caused Clay to have to pay these amounts. 
To prevent unjust enrichment, equity requires that Kinghorn pay to Clay the amount of 
$21,844.50 plus interest at 12% on the money lent as mandated in I.C. § 28-22-104. Thus, 
Kinghorn should be required to pay Kelly Clay interest of $6,056.49 on the money paid to the 
bank, interest of$303.69 on the money paid in taxes and interest of$87.14 on the money paid in 
insurance, road fees, and water fees. 2 This court should find that Kelly Clay is entitled to total 
interest of$6,447.32 as a result of Kinghorn's default. 
IV. KELL Y CLAY IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES INCURRED IN ENFORCING 
THE LOAN GUARANTEE AGREEMENT. 
The Loan Guarantee Agreement made between Krystal Barrett and Kelly Clay states that 
"Barrett further agrees to pay any and all attorney fees which may be incurred by Clay to enforce 
this Agreement and the Deed of Trust issued to Clay.,,3 Courts applying I.e. § 6-108 have held 
that if a contract between the parties contains a clause for attorney's fees, such clauses are valid 
and parties foreclosing on real property are entitled to such fees. Thompson v. Kirsch, 106 Idaho 
177, 181 (Id. App.1984). When contractual provisions for attorney's fees are inconsistent with 
LR.C.P. 54, courts have held that the contractual provision for attorney's fees supersedes the 
criteria of Rule 54. Zenner v. Holcomb, 147 Idaho 444, (2009). 
Krystal Kinghorn defaulted on the Loan Guarantee Agreement and Clay has incurred 
attorney's fees in enforcing the agreement. The Loan Guarantee Agreement is clear that 
Kinghorn shall pay "any and all attorney fees which may be incurred by Clay to enforce this 
2 See Credits for Clay Payments attached as Exhibit "A" attached to the Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith dated October 
1,2009. 
3 See Loan Guarantee Agreement attached as Exhibit "B" attached to the Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith dated October 
1 )flflQ Ir:",,,h.,c;c 0r1r1~rI\ 
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Agreement." There is no dispute that Kinghorn has breached the agreement by defaulting on the 
Loan Guarantee Agreement. The provision for attorney's fees is very broad and covers any fees 
incurred in enforcing the agreement through whatever means necessary. 
Therefore, Clay is entitled to the attorney's fees he has incurred as a result of Kinghorn's 
defaulting on the Loan Agreement Guarantee. Clay has submitted a memorandum of fees 
showing that $7,533.25 in attorney's fees have been incurred since January 12,2009, the date the 
court entered its Opinion, Decision, and Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Defendant Clay's Motion to Reconsider, granting Clay's motion and ordering that Clay hold a 
foreclosure sale. 
V. CONCLUSION. 
For all the reasons set forth above, Clay respectfully requests that this court find that 
Kinghorn be required to reimburse Clay $21,844.50 for the money he has spent in conjunction 
with the property at issue, that Kinghorn be required to pay interest in the amount $6,447.32 on 
this amount as mandated by I.C. § 28-22-104(1) and that Kinghorn be required to pay Clay's 
attorney's fees in the amo~7,339.50 for a total of$35,631.32. 
DA TED this 1 day of October, 2009. 
By: 
Bryan D. S 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~~ctober, 2009, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
to be served, by placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, 
postage prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the 
following: 
E.W. Pike, Esq. 
Alan Johnston, Esq. 
E. W. Pike & Associates 
151 N. Ridge Ave., Suite 210 
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949 
Bradley J. Dixon, Esq. 
Samia E. McCall, Esq. 
Stoel Rives, LLP 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, 
Suite 1900 
Boise, ID 83702 
[ Ws.Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ~S.Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 




KELL Y N. CLAY, an individual, BRP, 
INCORPORATED, an Idaho corporation, 
and THE BANK OF COMMERCE, an 
Idaho Banking corporation, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-07-0306 
OPfNION, DECISION, AND ORDER 
ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND DEFENDANT 
CLAY'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
filED IN CHAMBERS 
AT IDAHO FALLS 
BONNEVILLE COUN1Y 
HONORABLE JON J. SHINDURlING 
DATE -J-c i\! C '", ?.{) lO 
TIME ~~', (,'[18 t:l 
DEPUTY CLERK ;3;1,,,,," \ ,:'c-, kG.~", 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In May 2000, Plaintiff Krystal Kinghorn (Plaintiff) purchased Lot 15, Block 6, Buffalo 
River Estates Division No.2, Fremont County (the Property), The Property was conveyed to 
Plaintiff and her husband. In August 2005, Plaintiffs husband executed a Quitclaim Deed in 
favor of Plaintiff on the Property. In the Fall of 2005, Plaintiff and her husband divorced. 
In November 2005 Plaintiff approached The Bank of Commerce (the Bank) and applied 
for a $20,000 loan. Plaintiff agreed to pledge the Property and a mobile home on the Property as 
security for the loan. The Bank required Plaintiff to obtain a co-signor for the loan and a Deed of 
Trust on the Property. Defendant Kelly Clay (Defendant Clay) agreed to co-sign the loan. In 
December 2005, Plaintiff executed the bank loan documents, including the note, the Bank's 
Deed of Trust, Truth-in-Lending Disclosures, Settlement Statement, Servicing Disclosure 
Statement, Agreement to Provide Insurance, Errors and Omissions Agreement, and Consumer 
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Account Agreement. Nolan Lee, a representative of the bank, notarized Plaintiff's signature on 
the documents. 
Plaintiff was able to make payments on the loan for the first year of the loan period, but 
on March 2, 2007, Defendant Clay received written notice that Plaintiff had missed two 
payments on the loan. On March 8, 2007, Defendant Clay made two payments on the loan. On 
March 9, 2007, Defendant Clay recorded the Quitclaim Deed on the Property executed by 
Plaintiff. Defendant Clay then paid off the balance of the loan. Defendant Clay later sold the 
Property to Defendant BRP. At the time of sale, Defendant Clay provided Defendant BRP with 
a warranty deed, wherein Defendant Clay warranted that the Property was free from claims of all 
other persons. 
On May 29, 2007, Plaintiff filed a claim with Fremont County alleging an invalid 
transfer, fraud, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and the existence of a 
constructive trust. 
Following various motions from the Parties, the Court granted the Bank's motion for 
summary judgment and granted in part Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment in an 
August 22, 2008 opinion. The court held that the Quitclaim Deed was a mortgage and that 
Defendant Clay violated Plaintiff's right of redemption. The court denied Plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment on the issue of invalid transfer, finding that whether Defendant BRP was a 
bona fide purchaser was a question of fact appropriate for the jury. 
On October 2, 2008, Defendant Clay filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that Plaintiff 
had failed to exercise her redemption rights. On October 8, 2008, Plaintiff filed a motion for 
partial summary judgment on the issue of Defendant BRP's status as a bona fide purchaser, 
supported by new affidavit. 
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The Court granted Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment, holding that 
Defendant BRP was not a bona fide purchaser of the Property. The Court also granted Defendant 
Clay's motion for reconsideration and ordered Defendant Clay to hold a foreclosure sale in 
accordance with Idaho Code Title 6 Chapter 1. 
On August 6, 2009, the Parties stipulated that they would perform an accounting between 
themselves and convey the Property without the need of holding a foreclosure sale. The parties 
further stipulated that they would file cross motions for summary judgment on the accounting 
issues and allow the Court to determine the items that should be charged to each party in 
connection with the reconveyance as if Defendant Clay had held a foreclosure sale. On 
December 4, 2009, Defendant Clay moved to strike the affidavit of Brett Whitaker, which 
Plaintiff filed in support of her motion for summary judgment. 
On September 24, 2009, Defendant BRP filed a cross claim against Defendant Clay for 
breach of the warranty deed and then moved for summary judgment. Defendant Clay does not 
oppose Defendant BRP's motion for summary judgment. 
The Court heard oral argument on the motions for summary judgment and Defendant 
Clay'S motion to strike on December 8, 2009, before taking the matter under advisement. After 
considering the Court's file, pleadings. depositions, admissions, affidavits, and the argument of 
counsel, the Court renders the following opinion. 
II. STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION 
Summary judgment is only appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 
file, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). When 
considering a motion for summary judgment in a case scheduled for a jury trial, any disputed 
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facts are construed in favor of the nonmoving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be 
drawn from the record are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 
894, 896, 155 P.3d 695, 697 (2007). If reasonable minds might come to different conclusions, 
summary judgment is inappropriate. McPheters v. }.1aile, 138 Idaho 391, 394, 64 P.3d 317,320 
(2003). 
The rule is different in cases where a jury trial has not been requested. P. a. Ventures, Inc. 
v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 237, 159 P.3d 870 (2007). In cases 
scheduled for a bench trial, "the court is entitled to draw the most probable inferences from the 
undisputed evidence properly before it, and may grant the summary judgment despite the 
possibility of conflicting inferences." Johnson v. McPhee, 147 Idaho 455, 210 P.3d 563, 567 (Ct. 
App. 2009). "Drawing probable inferences under such circumstances is permissible since the 
court, as the trier of fact, would be responsible for resolving conflicting inferences at trial." 
Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho 117, 206 P.3d 481, 
488 (2009). However, disputed factual issues must still be construed in favor of the nonmoving 
party. Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 Idaho 668, 670, 691 P.2d 1283, (Ct. App. 1984). The fact that 
both parties move for summary judgment does not necessarily mean that no genuine issues of 
material fact exist. Moss v. Mid-Am. Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 103 Idaho 298, 302, 647 P.2d 754, 
758 (1982). 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Defendant Clay's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Defendant Clay seeks summary judgment on the following four issues. First, Defendant 
Clay argues that he is entitled to summary judgment as to the $19,820.75 that he paid to the Bank 
after Plaintiff defaulted on the loan cosigned by Defendant Clay. Plaintiff does not dispute that 
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Defendant Clay is entitled to recover this amount. Thus, the Court finds that there are no 
questions of fact as to whether Defendant Clay is entitled to recover the $19,820.75 paid to the 
Bank: and, therefore, summary judgment is appropriate as to this amount. 
Second, Defendant Clay argues that he is entitled to recover on summary judgment 
$6,056.49 in interest on the amount paid to the Bank: to satisfy the loan. Defendant Clay contends 
that Plaintiff will be unjustly enriched if he is not reimbursed this amount. 
The doctrine of unjust enrichment sounds in quasi-contract or implied-in-law 
contract. Beco Constr. Co., Inc. v. Bannock Paving Co., Inc., 118 Idaho 463, 466, 
797 P.2d 863, 866 (1990). The theory is based upon the defendant having 
received a benefit which would be inequitable to retain at least without 
compensating the plaintiff to the extent that retention of the benefit is unjust. Id. 
In order to establish the prima facie case for unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must 
show that there was: (1) a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; 
(2) appreciation by the defendant of such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the 
benefit under circumstances that would be inequitable for the defendant to retain 
the benefit without payment to the plaintiff of the value thereof. Idaho Lumber, 
Inc. v. Buck, 109 Idaho 737, 745, 710 P.2d 647,655 (Ct.App.1985). 
Curtis v. Becker, 130 Idaho 378, 382, 941 P.2d 350,354 (Ct. App. 1997). 
A party's ability to recover on a theory of unjust enrichment is limited by the "clean 
hands" doctrine. 
The clean hands doctrine is a well-established principle to which this Court has 
long subscribed. See Malcolm v. Hanmer, 64 Idaho 66, 127 P.2d 331 (1942). 
Simply stated the maxim stands for the proposition that "a litigant may be denied 
relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, 
unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent and deceitful as to the controversy in issue." 
See 27 Am.lur.2d Equity § 136 (1966) (footnotes omitted). The clean hands 
doctrine, however, "is not one of absolutes and [it] should be applied in the 
court's discretion, so as to accomplish its purpose of promoting public policy and 
the integrity of the courts." Id. (Footnote omitted.) Thus, the fact that a party has 
engaged in inequitable conduct will not always result in that party being denied 
relief under the clean hands doctrine. 
Gilbert v. Nampa School Dist. No. 13I, 104 Idaho 137, 145,657 P.2d 1, 9 (1983). 
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The Court must "evaluate the relative conduct of both parties and ... determine whether 
the party seeking equitable relief should in the light of all the circumstances be precluded from 
such relief." Thomas v. Med. Center Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 209, 61 P.3d 557 (2002). 
In the present case, although Plaintiff defaulted on the loan agreement, it was Defendant 
Clay's failure to honor Plaintiff s right of redemption that delayed repayment and caused interest 
to accrue. Had Defendant Clay given Plaintiff the opportunity to redeem her property in the first 
place, as was required by law, then Defendant Clay would have received repayment much 
sooner. Defendant Clay cannot now recover "damages" caused by his own failure to follow the 
law. Thus, summary judgment is inappropriate as to the $6,056.49 in interest on the amount 
Defendant Clay paid the Bank. 
Third, Defendant Clay argues that he is entitled to summary judgment as to the $2,023.75 
that he paid (or reimbursed Defendant BRP) in property taxes, insurance, and subdivision road 
and water fees to maintain the Property. 
Unlike the interest on the amount Defendant Clay paid the Bank, the maintenance 
charges would have accrued whether or not Plaintiff was properly allowed to redeem the 
Property. By paying the maintenance charges while the Property was in limbo, Defendant Clay 
conferred a benefit that was ultimately appreciated by Plaintiff as the owner of the Property. Had 
Defendant Clay not paid the maintenance charges as they came due, the Property likely would 
have become encumbered with liens and Plaintiff may have been subject to late fees. Therefore, 
the Court finds that Defendant Clay is entitled to summary judgment as to the $2,023.75 that he 
paid to maintain the Property, along with interest on the amount at the statutory rate of 12 
percent per anum, I.C. § 28-22-104, for a total of$2,414.58. 
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Finally, Defendant Clay argues that he is entitled to summary judgment as to $7,533.25 
in attorney's fees incurred defending the instant action. Defendant Clay contends that the Loan 
Guarantee Agreement requires Plaintiff to pay "any and all attorney fees which may be incurred 
by Clay to enforce this Agreement." 
The Court finds the foregoing contractual provIsIOn inapplicable. Defendant Clay'S 
attorney's fees were not incurred "to enforce [the] Agreement" but, rather, were incurred to 
defend against Plaintiff's action to enforce her right of redemption. Therefore, Defendant Clay is 
not entitled to an award of attorney's fees. 
B. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on the following two issues. First, Plaintiff argues that 
she is entitled to summary judgment as to $9,000.00 for "loss of use" of the Property. Plaintiff 
contends that she is entitled to the fair rental value for the time she was wrongfully deprived of 
her property. However, Plaintiff failed to plead this issue in her complaint. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a party must raise an issue in its pleadings before 
the district court may consider it on summary judgment. Gardner v. Evans, 110 Idaho 925, 719 
P.2d 1185 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1007, 107 S.Ct. 645. 
It has been the rule in Idaho that "issues considered on summary jUdgment are 
those raised by the pleadings." Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 Idaho 668, 669, 691 P.2d 
1283, 1284 (Ct. App. 1984); see also First Security Bank of Idaho, NA. v. Absco 
Warehouse, Inc., 104 Idaho 853, 855, 664 P.2d 281,283 (Ct. App. 1983). The 
facts of this case show that the issue of defamation has in no way been raised by 
the pleadings; there is nothing within the pleadings which can fairly be viewed as 
adequately giving notice of the claim. We accordingly decline to rule on this 
claim at this late date. 
Id. at 939. 
The Court finds that Plaintiff failed to raise the issue of "loss of use" of the Property in 
its pleadings. The claim for "waste" in Plaintiff's complaint does not adequately raise the issue 
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now sought by Plaintiff on summary judgment. Therefore, summary judgment is inappropriate as 
to the $9,000.00 alleged by Plaintiff for "loss of use" of the Property. 
Second, Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to summary judgment as to $33,950.32 in 
attorney's fees incurred as a result of the instant action. Plaintiff bases her claim to attorney's 
fees on I.e. § 12-121, which provides: 
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the 
prevailing party or parties, provided that this section shall not alter, repeal or 
amend any statute which otherwise provides for the award of attorney's fees. The 
term "party" or "parties" is defined to include any person, partnership, 
corporation, association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political 
subdivision thereof. 
Attorney fees are awarded to the prevailing party only if "the Court determines that the 
action was brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Baker v. 
Sullivan, 132 Idaho 746, 751,979 P.2d 619,624 (1999). Frivolous conduct is defined as conduct 
that satisfies one of the following conditions: 
(i) It obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure another party to the 
civil action; 
(ii) It is not supported in fact or warranted under existing law and cannot be 
supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law. 
I.e. § 12-123. 
Not every case decided on summary judgment will result in an award of attorney's fees. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has explained that: 
Where questions of law are raised, attorney fees should be awarded under I.e. § 
12-121 only if the nonprevailing party advocates a plainly fallacious, and, 
therefore, not fairly debatable, position. 
A misperception of law or of one's interest under the law is not, by itself, 
unreasonable conduct. If it were, virtually every case controlled by a question of 
law would entail an attorney fee award against the losing party under I.e. § 12-
121. Rather, the question must be whether the position adopted by the owner was 
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not only incorrect but so plainly fallacious that it could be deemed frivolous, 
unreasonable or without foundation. 
Lowery v. Board o/County Comm 'rs/or Ada County, 115 Idaho 64, 69, 764 P.2d 431,436 (Ct. 
App. 1988) (internal citations omitted). 
In the case at bar, each Party has prevailed on some of the issues. The Court finds that, 
although the Parties may have misperceived the law or their interests under the law, neither Party 
adopted a position that was "so plainly fallacious that it could be deemed frivolous, unreasonable 
or without foundation." Jd. Therefore, Plaintiff is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees 
under I.C. § 12-121. 
Plaintiff argues in the alternative that she is entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to I.e. § 
12-123(3). That statute authorizes attorney's fees as follows: 
Id. 
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note bill, 
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of 
goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless 
otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable 
attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
Plaintiff did not file the instant action "to recover" on any of the instruments listed in the 
statute. Therefore, I.C. § 12-120(3) is inapplicable. Plaintiff is not entitled to an award of 
attorney's fees on this basis. 
e. Defendant Clay's Motion to Strike 
Defendant Clay moves the Court for an order striking the affidavit of Brett Whitaker on 
the grounds that Whitaker was not qualified as an expert and his testimony lacks proper 
foundation. Whitaker's testimony was offered to establish Plaintiff's claim for "loss of use" of 
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the Property. Because the Court denied Plaintiffs claim on other grounds, Defendant Clay's 
motion to strike is rendered moot and will, therefore, be denied. 
D. Defendant BRP's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Defendant BRP seeks summary judgment on its cross claim against Defendant Clay for 
breach of the warranty deed. Defendant Clay does not oppose this motion. 
This Court previously ruled that, at the time Defendant Clay sold the Property to 
Defendant BRP, Plaintiff held a right of redemption that was denied her. Defendant BRP was 
ordered to return the Property to Defendant Clay. Thus, the Court finds that Defendant Clay 
breached the warranty deed as a matter of law and, therefore, Defendant BRP is entitled to 
summary judgment on its cross claim. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Therefore, it is hereby ordered that Defendant Clay's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Defendant Clay is entitled to $22,235.33. 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. 
Defendant BRP's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Defendant Clay 
breached the warranty deed as a matter of law. 
Defendant Clay's Motion to Strike is DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this ---"--=- day of January, 2010. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 2:.1 day of January, 2010, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing OPINION, DECISION, AND ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND DEFENDANT CLAY'S MOTION TO STRIKE upon the parties listed 
below by mailing, with the correct postage thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered to 
their courthouse boxes. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
E.W. Pike 
Alan Johnston 
E. W. Pike & Associates 
151 N. Ridge Ave., Suite 210 
PO Box 2949 
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Bryan D. Smith 
McGrath Meacham 
410 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Bradley J. Dixon 
Samia E. McCall 
Jennifer Reinhardt 
Stoel Rives 
101 South Capitol Blvd. 
Suite 1900 
Boise, ID 83702 
Clerk of the District Court 
Fremont County, Idaho 
, .... 
by 8v\£e. Uc~iL~\ 
Deputy Clerk 
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James C. Herndon 
Alan Johnston 
E. W. PIKE & ASSOCIATES, P.A. 
151 N. Ridge Ave., Suite 210 
P.O. Box 2949 
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949 
Telephone: 208/528-6444 
Telefax: 208/528-6447 
ISB # 1083 & 7709 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
KRYSTAL M. KINGHORN, f/lc/a 
KRYST AL M. BARRETT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KELL Y N. CLAY, an individual, 
BRP, INCORPORATED, an Idaho 
corporation, and THE BANK OF 

















Case No. CV -07-306 
SECOND AMENDMENT TO THE 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Plaintiff Krystal M. Kinghorn f/k/a Krystal M. Barrett ("Krystal"), through her attorneys, 
amends her Amended Complaint by adding the following language: 
LOSS OF USE OF PROPERTY 
1. Plaintiff realleges all allegations in the Amended Complaint and Amendment to 
the Amended Complaint, and incorporates the same as reference. 
Second Amendment to the Amended 
Claim 
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2. Since the time BRP purchased the property from Clay, BRP has had possession of 
the property. 
3. While BRP has had possession of the property, it refused to allow Plaintiff access 
to the property, or use of the property. 
4. As a result ofBRP's actions, Plaintiff was deprived access to the property. 
5. Plaintiff has suffered damages as a result of the loss of use of the property in an 
amount to be proven at trial. 
WHEREFORE, Krystal adds to her prayer for relief as follows: 
1. For damages suffered resulting from loss of use of the property. 
DATED this 50 day of March, 2010. 
~ 
Alan Johnst: z:5l: 
Pike Herndon Stosich & Jolmston, P.A. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
KRYSTAL M. KINGHORN, flk/a 
KRYSTAL M. BARRETT, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KELL Y N. CLAY, an individual, BRP, 
INCORPORATED, an Idaho corporation, 
and THE BANK OF COMMERCE, an 
Idaho Banking corporation, 
Defendants. 




I<ELL Y l'!. CL./\.Y, an indi'.'idual, 
Cross-defendant. 
I. 
Case No. CV-07-0306 
OPINION, DECISION, AND ORDER 
ON CLAY'S MOTION TO DISALLOW 
COSTS AND FEES AND OBJECTION 
TO REQUEST FOR AMOUNTS DUE 
ON JUDGMENT 
FILED IN CHAMBERS 
AT IDAHO FALLS 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY 
HONORABLE JON J. SHINDURLlNG 
DATE M4:i >j ! ?c Ie 
TIME 2: :;c \')M 
DEPUTY CLERK ~}W I'~ 1& (ii.;l{ L, 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In May 2000 Krystal Kinghorn purchased Lot 15, Block 6, Buffalo River Estates 
Division No.2, Fremont County. The property was conveyed to Ms. Kinghorn and her husband. 
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In August 2005 Ms. Kinghorn's husband executed a Quitclaim Deed in favor of Ms. Kinghorn 
on the property. In the Fall of 2005 Ms. Kinghorn and her husband divorced. 
In November 2005 Ms. Kinghorn approached The Bank of Commerce ("the Bank") and 
applied for a $20,000 loan. Ms. Kinghorn agreed to pledge the property and a mobile horne on 
the property as security for the loan. The Bank required Ms. Kinghorn to obtain a co-signor for 
the loan and a Deed of Trust on the property. Kelly Clay agreed to co-sign the loan. In December 
2005, Ms. Kinghorn executed the bank loan documents, including the note, the Bank's Deed of 
Trust, Truth-in-Lending Disclosures, Settlement Statement, Servicing Disclosure Statement, 
Agreement to Provide Insurance, Errors and Omissions Agreement, and Consumer Account 
Agreement. Nolan Lee, a representative of the bank, notarized Ms. Kinghorn's signature on the 
documents. 
Ms. Kinghorn was able to make payments on the loan for the first year of the loan period, 
but on March 2,2007, Mr. Clay received written notice that Ms. Kinghorn had missed two 
payments on the loan. On March 8, 2007, Mr. Clay made two payments on the loan. On March 9, 
2007, Mr. Clay recorded the Quitclaim Deed on the property executed by Ms. Kinghorn. Mr. 
Clay then paid off the balance of the loan. Clay and BRP entered into a purchase agreement on 
April 23, 2007. BRP paid Clay $30,000.00 for the property and Clay delivered title and a 
warranty deed to BRP. 
On May 29,2007, Ms. Kinghorn filed a claim with Fremont County alleging an invalid 
transfer, fraud, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and the existence of a 
constructive trust. 
Following various motions from the parties the court granted the Bank's motion for 
summary judgment and granted in part Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment in an 
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August 22, 2008 opinion. The court held that the quitclaim deed was a mortgage, and that Clay 
violated Plaintiff s right of redemption. The court denied Plaintiff s motion for summary 
judgment on the issue of invalid transfer, finding that whether BRP was a bona fide purchaser 
was a question of fact appropriate for the jury. 
On January 13,2009, this court entered summary judgment against BRP and ordered 
Clay to hold a sheriffs sale. 
On January 26,2010, this court granted summary judgment to BRP in its crossclaim 
against Clay for breach of the warranty deed. 
On February 23, 2010, BRP filed this motion for costs and fees incurred in enforcing its 
warranty deed against Clay. 
Following responsive briefing, this matter came up for hearing on March 31, 2010. At 
that time the court took this matter under advisement. 
After considering the Court's file, pleadings, depositions, admissions, affidavits, and the 
argument of counsel, the Court renders the following opinion. 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Commercial Transaction 
BRP characterizes its dealings with Clay as a commercial transaction, one qualifying for 
attorney's fees under I. C. § 12-120(3). Clay disagrees, arguing that the transaction was not a 
commercial transaction because it was for real estate. 
I.e. § 12-120(3) provides: 
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, 
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of 
goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless 
otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable 
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attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. The term 
"commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions except transactions 
for personal or household purposes. The term "party" is defined to mean any 
person, partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the state of 
Idaho or political subdivision thereof. 
The award of attorney fees is not warranted every time a commercial transaction IS 
remotely connected with the case. Rather, the test is whether the commercial transaction 
comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit. Attorney's fees are not appropriate under I.C. § 12-120(3) 
unless the commercial transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which 
the party is attempting to recover. Brower v. E.I DuPont De Nemours & Co., 117 Idaho 780, 
784, 792 P.2d 345, 349 (1990). 
BRP argues that though the transaction was for a personal home, neither BRP nor Clay 
ever intended to live in the house and both saw it solely as an investment property. 
Clay argues that whether either party planned to live in the house is irrelevant because 
real estate transactions are not commercial transactions. The Idaho Supreme Court has recently 
said "commercial transactions generally do not include real estate transactions or issues 
involving the ownership of property, such as an action to quiet title." Anderson v. Rex Hayes 
Family Trust 145 Idaho 741,745, 185 P.3d 253,257 (2008) (quoting Treasure Valley Concrete, 
Inc. v. State, 132 Idaho 673 (1999)). In contrast to this case, in Anderson and Treasure Valley 
Concrete, the transactions in question were actions to quiet title with no exchange of 
consideration between the parties. 
As BRP points out, despite the language in Anderson, Idaho courts do award attorney's 
fees in cases involving real estate transactions. In Lexington Heights Development, LLC v. 
Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276, 287, 92 P.3d 526, 537 (2004), the Idaho Supreme Court held that a 
party to a real estate transaction could receive fees as a prevailing party to a commercial 
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transaction. I 
Clay argues that BRP has failed to produce evidence that this sale was a commercial 
transaction. Viewing the facts before the court, it appears unlikely that BRP purchased the land 
for "personal or household purposes." Kinghorn presented evidence that no one ever entered the 
property from the time Clay entered the quitclaim deed, BRP purchased the property with cash 
after a brief discussion and no examination of the land, and BRP is a corporation. 
The sale of the property and warranty deed was a commercial transaction. This exchange 
could not reasonably be described as a personal or household purchase. 
There are no other facts or controversies involved in the cross-claim outside of the sale of 
property and the warranty deed. The transaction forms the gravamen of BRP's cross-claim. BRP 
was the prevailing party in its cross-claim to recover on a contract relating to a commercial 
transaction and qualifies for reasonable attorney's fees under I.c. § 12-120(3). 
Fees 
BRP requests fees in the amount of $5,140.00 and costs in the amount of $490.48. Clay 
objects to these costs. 
What constitutes a reasonable fee is a discretionary determination for the trial court, to be 
guided by the criteria of Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(e)(3). Sanders v. Lanliford, 
134 Idaho 322, 1 P.3d 823 (Ct. App. 2000); see also Daisy Mig Co., Inc. v. Paintball Sports, 
Inc., 134 Idaho 259,999 P.2d 914 (Ct. App. 2000). Among the criteria to be considered are the 
time and labor required and "any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the particular 
case." LR.C.P. 54(e)(3)(A),(L). However, the court may not focus upon such other factors to the 
exclusion of the time and labor and the remaining factors listed in Rule 54(e)(3). Sanders v. 
I BRP cites to a number of cases supporting this argument. See Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430,435,80 P.3d 
1031, 1036 (2003); Farm Credit Bank a/Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270 (1994). 
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Lankford, 134 Idaho 322, 1 P.3d 823 (Ct. App. 2000); see also DeWils Interiors, Inc. v. Dines, 
106 Idaho 288, 290, 678 P.2d 80, 82 (Ct. App. 1984). 
BRP chose to retain counsel located in Boise, Idaho. Of the $5,140.00 requested in fees, 
$2,449.00 represents travel costs to and from Eastern Idaho. Parties are free to be represented by 
whomever they wish; however, BRP has not shown that retaining out-of-town counsel was 
necessary or that any exceptional characteristic of this case required it to do so. 
Similarly, of the $490.48 requested in costs, $453.28 is related to travel from Boise. The 
rest of the costs requested appear to be normal costs associated with litigation and are not 
exceptional. 
The remaining fees requested appear reasonable and appropriate. BRP is awarded 
$2,691.00 in fees for prevailing in its cross-claim against Clay. 
B. Warranty Deed 
Clay argues BRP must have made an effective tender of defense to Clay before it is 
entitled to recover under the warranty deed. Clay bases this argument on cases decided in the 
Washington Court of Appeals. In Dixon v. Fiat-Roosevelt Motors, Inc., 8 Wash.App. 689, 509 
P.2d 86 (1973), that court said a tender of defense: 
[I]s equivalent to "vouching in", a common law device by which a defendant 
notifies another (1) of the pendency of the suit against him, (2) that if liability is 
found, the defendant will look to the vouchee for indemnity, (3) that the notice 
constitutes a formal tender of the right to defend the action, and (4) that if the 
vouchee refuses to defend, it will be bound in a subsequent litigation between 
them to the factual determination necessary to the original judgment. 
The Washington Court of Appeals held that a tender can be inadequate if it does not 
provide sufficient notice to the third-party defendant to prepare a notice. Dixon, 8 Wash.App. at 
693. 
The Washington doctrine-which has not been adopted in Idaho-is inapplicable to this 
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case. There is no suggestion that Clay lacked notice of any claims against BRP-they were 
codefendants. Clay was involved in every step of this litigation and vigorously defended the 
transaction. Clay is liable under the warranty deed for the cost of defending BRP's possession of 
the property against Kinghorn's claims. 
Clay also objects to the amount requested by BRP for not defending the warranty deed. 
BRP requests $122,044.00 in fees for defending against Kinghorn's claim in addition to the 
$30,000.00 paid under the purchase agreement. 
Clay argues that $122,044 in fees is exceSSIve to defend claims against a $30,000 
property. BRP's counsel billed time spent by ten different employees working on this case for 
610.2 hours at an average of $200 an hour. 
After reviewing the exhibits and affidavits of counsel for BRP, it is apparent that the 
request for $122,044 is unreasonable. Many of the hours represent unnecessary travel and 
duplicative work. Even subtracting all of the apparent travel and duplicative hours leaves a sum 
that far exceeds the $30,000 at issue in Kinghorn's claim against BRP. 
This claim for an amount of attorney's fees far in excess of the value of the underlying 
controversy is unreasonable. BRP has not presented any evidence that this case required 
$122,000 or even $60,000 in attorney's fees. 
$30,000 is a reasonable amount of attorney's fees for the representation done for BRP. 
Opinion, Decision & Order on Clay's 
Motion to Disallow Costs & Fees & 
Objection to Request for Amounts Due >ER ON CLAY'S MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND FEES AND 




Therefore, it is hereby ordered that BRP is granted reasonable attorney's fees of $2,691 
as the prevailing party in its cross-claim against Kelly N. Clay. BRP is granted reasonable 
attorney's fees of$30,000 for Clay's failure to defend under the warranty deed. 
/ 
I 
IT IS SO ORDERED. ! 
Dated this ~ day of May, 2010. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this day of May, 2010, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing OPINION, DECISION, AND ORDER ON CLAY'S MOTION TO DISALLOW 
COSTS AND FEES AND OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR AMOUNTS DUE ON 
JUDGMENT upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct postage thereon, or by 
causing the same to be delivered to their courthouse boxes. 
Attorney for Plaintiff Kinghorn 
Alan Johnston 
E. W. Pike & Associates 
151 N. Ridge Ave., Suite 210 
PO Box 2949 
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949 
Attorneys for Defendant Clay 
Bryan D. Smith 
McGrath Meacham 
410 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Attorneys for Defendant/CrosscIaimant BRP 
Bradley J. Dixon 
Samia E. McCall 
Jennifer Reinhardt 
Stoel Rives 
101 South Capitol Blvd. 
Suite 1900 
Boise, ID 83702 
by 
Clerk of the District Court 
Fremont County, Idaho 
Deputy Clerk 
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Bradley J. Dixon, ISB No. 6167 
Email: bjdixon@Stoel.com 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt, ISB No. 7432 
Email: jmreinhardt@Stoel.com 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1900 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 389-9000 
Fax Number: (208) 389-9040 
Attorneys for Defendant BRP, Incorporated 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
KRYSTAL M. KINGHORN, flk/a 
KR YST AL M. BARRETT, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KELLY N. CLAY, an individual, BRP, 
INCORPORATED, an Idaho corporation, 
and THE BANK OF COMMERCE, an 
Idaho Banking corporation, 
Defendants. 




KELLY N. CLAY, an individual, 
Cross-Defendant. 
Case No. CV-07-0306 
FINAL JUDGMENT RE: CROSS CLAIM 
Based upon the Memorandum Decision and Order filed on January 29, 2010, regarding 
BRP, Inc. 's Cross-claim Against Kelly Clay for Breach of the Warranty Deed, and good and 
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sufficient cause appearing therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED AND THIS DOES ORDER, ADJUDGE AND DECREE, as follows: 
Defendant BRP, Inc. shall have judgment against Kelly Clay for damages in the amount 
of $31 ,408.96 to accrue interest at the legal rate of interest from the date of entry of this Final 
Judgment (10.125% pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-22-104) until paid in full. In addition, and 
consistent with the Opinion, Decision, and Order on Clay's Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees 
And Objection to Request for Amount Due on Judgment, Defendant BRP, Inc. is awarded its 
reasonable fees for prevailing on its cross-claim against Defendant Clay in the amount of 
$2,691.00. Further, and consistent with the Opinion, Decision, and Order on Clay's Motion to 
Disallow Costs and Fees And Objection to Request for Amount Due on Judgment, Defendant 
BRP, Inc. is awarded its reasonable fees and costs in the amount of $30,000.00 against 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this J::la '3 dc· ,2010, I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing FINAL JUDGMENT RE: CROSS CLAIM to the parties below: 
E.W. Pike 
Erika Lessing 
E. W. PIKE & ASSOCIATES, P.A. 
151 N. Ridge Ave., Suite 210 
PO Box 2949 
Idaho Falls, 10 83403 
Attorneysfor Plaintiff 
Bryan D. Smith 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES 
414 Shoup A venue 
PO Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, 10 83405 
Attorney for Defendant Kelly Clay 
Douglas R. Nelson 
Brian T. Tucker 
Anderson Nelson Hall Smith, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
Post Office Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, 10 83405 
Attorneys for Defendant The Bank of 
Commerce 
Bradley J. Dixon 
J enni fer M. Reinhardt 
Stoel Rives LLP 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Suite 1900 
Boise, 10 83702 
Attorneys for BRP, Inc. 
Final Judgment Re: Cross Claim 
Page 230 
=ROSS CLAIM - 3 
Bradley J. Dixon, ISB No. 6167 
Email: bjdixon@Stoel.com 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt, ISB No. 7432 
Email: jmreinhardt@Stoel.com 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1900 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 389-9000 
Fax Number: (208) 389-9040 
Attorneys for Defendant BRP, Incorporated 
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
KRYSTAL M. KINGHORN, f/k/a 
KR YST AL M. BARRETT, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KELLY N. CLAY, an individual, BRP, 
INCORPORATED, an Idaho corporation, 
and THE BANK OF COMMERCE, an 
Idaho Banking corporation, 
Defendants. 




KELLY N. CLAY, an individual, 
Cross-Defendant. 
Case No. CV-07-0306 
AMENDED [PROPOSED) FINAL 
JUDGMENT RE: CROSS CLAIM 
Based upon the Memorandum Decision and Order filed on January 29,2010, regarding 
BRP,Inc.'s Cross-claim Against Kelly Clay for Breach of the Warranty Deed, and good and 
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sufficient cause appearing therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED AND THIS DOES ORDER, ADJUDGE AND DECREE, as follows: 
Defendant BRP, Inc. shall have judgment against Kelly Clay for damages in the amount 
of $31 ,408.96 to accrue interest at the legal rate of interest from the date of entry of this Final 
Judgment (5.625% pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-22-104) until paid in full. In addition, and 
consistent with the Opinion, Decision, and Order on Clay's Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees 
And Objection to Request for Amount Due on Judgment, Defendant BRP, Inc. is awarded its 
reasonable fees for prevailing on its cross-claim against Defendant Clay in the amount of 
$2,691.00. Further, and consistent with the Opinion, Decision, and Order on Clay's Motion to 
Disallow Costs and Fees And Objection to Request for Amount Due on Judgment, Defendant 
BRP, Inc. is awarded its reasonable fees and costs in the amount of$30,000.00 against 
Defendant Clay expended in defending title to the property t-issue in this litigation. 
(/~ 
DATED: ill ,2010. 
Ho 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~'-LL-'--"'---"-..L-_, 2010, I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing AMENDED [PROPOSED) FINAL JUDGMENT RE: CROSS 
CLAIM to the parties below: 
E.W. Pike 
Erika Lessing 
E.W. PIKE & ASSOCIATES, P.A. 
151 N. Ridge Ave., Suite 210 
PO Box 2949 
Idaho Falls, 10 83403 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Bryan D. Smith 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES 
414 Shoup A venue 
PO Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, 10 83405 
Attorney for Defendant Kelly Clay 
Douglas R. Nelson 
Brian T. Tucker 
Anderson Nelson Hall Smith, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
Post Office Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, 10 83405 
Attorneys jar Defendant The Bank of 
Commerce 
Bradley J. Dixon 
. Jennifer M. Reinhardt 
Stoel Rives LLP 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Suite 1900 
Boise, 10 83702 
Attorneys for BRP, Inc. 
By: 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
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KELLY N. CLAY, an individual, BRP, 
INCORPORATED, an Idaho corporation, 
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Defendant/Cross Claimant BRP Incorporated ("BRP"), by and through its attorneys of 
record, moves this Court, pursuant to Idaho Code §8-50 1, for issuance of a writ of attachment 
upon certain real property located at 4058 Steelhead Drive, Island Park, Freemont County, State 
of Idaho (the "Property") owned by Cross-Defendant Kelly N. Clay ("Clay") as well as any sums 
of money realized by Clay by virtue of any disposition or conveyance of the Property in order to 
secure the indebtedness owed by Clay to BRP. 
On April 23, 2007, Clay sold the Property to BRP for the amount of$30,000. At the time 
that Clay sold the Property to BRP, Clay provided BRP with a Warranty Deed dated April 23, 
2007, in which Clay warranted that the Property was free from claims of all persons. At the time 
the Property was sold to BRP according to the ruling of the Court in the above captioned matter, 
the title was not free and clear of claims of all other persons. As such, this Court directed BRP to 
reconvey the Property to Clay. Thereafter, BRP successfully prosecuted a Cross Claim against 
Clay and was awarded damages in the amount of$31 ,408.96, attorney fees in the amount of 
$2,691.00 for the prosecution of the Cross Claim, attorney fees in the amount of$30,000.00 for 
the defense of the title to the Property and interest at the statutory rate. 
Clay and Plaintiff Krystal M. Kinghorn ("Kinghorn") have stipulated that Kinghorn must 
pay the sum of $22,235.33 on or before July 26,2010 (the "Payment") or Clay shall have no 
duty to reconvey the Property to Kinghorn. 
In the event that the Payment is not made, BRP is entitled to attach the Property to secure 
the debt owed to BRP by Clay. In the event the Payment is made to Clay by Kinghorn, BRP is 
.' I 
entitled to the entirety of such sums and this Courfsliould prohibit any conveyance of the 
Property to Kinghorn without the Payment being directed to BRP. 
Petition for Writ of Attachment 
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The debt owed by Clay to BRP is not secured by any mortgage, deed of trust, security 
interest or lien. This requested attachment is not prosecuted to hinder, delay or defraud any 
creditor of Clay. This Petition is supported by the Affidavit of Bradley 1. Dixon filed 
concurrently herewith. 
Oral argument is requested. 
DATED: June~, 2010. 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
Bra y lxon 
Attorney for Defendant/Cross Claimant BRP, 
Incorporated 
Petition for Writ of Attachment 
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CERTIFICA TE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thi~ay of June, 2010, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR WRIT OF ATTACHMENT by the method indicated 
below, addressed to the following: 
Jon J. Shindurling 
District Judge 
Bonneville County District Court 
605 N. Capital A venue 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 Via U.S. Mail 
E.W. Pike [ ] Via U.S. Mail 
Erika Lessing GtJ Via Facsimile 
E. W. PIKE & ASSOCIATES, P .A. r ] Via Overnight Mail 
151 N. Ridge Ave., Suite 210 [ ] Via Hand Delivery 
PO Box 2949 
Idaho Falls, ID 83403 
Facsimile: 208-528-6447 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Bryan D. Smith [ J Via U.S. Mail 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES r ~ Via Facsimile 
414 Shoup A venue [ ] Via Overnight Mail 
PO Box 50731 [ ] Via Hand Delivery 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Facsimile: 208-529-4166 
Attorney for Defendant Kelly Clay 
Petition for Writ of Attachment 
Page 237 
OF ATTACHMENT-4 
06/09/2010 14 14 FAX 
Bradley J. Dixon, ISB No. 6167 
Emait- bjdixon~toel.com 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt, ISB No. 7432 
Email: jmreinhardt@Stoel.com 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
10 1 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1900 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 389-9000 
Fax Number: (208) 389-9040 
Attorneys for Defendant/Cross-Claimant BRP, 
Incorporated 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, fN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
KRYSTALM. KINGHORN, flkla 
KRYSTAL M. BARRETT, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KELLY N. CLAY, an individual, BRP, 
INCORPORATED, an Idaho corporation, 
and THE BANK OF COMMERCE, an 
Idaho Banking corporation, 
Defendants. 




KELLY N. eLA Y, an individual, 
Cross-Defendant. 
Affidavit of Bradley j, Dixon in Support 
Case No. CV-07-0306 
AFFIDA VIT OF BRADLEY J. DIXON IN 
SUPPORT OF BRP INC.'8 PETITION 
FOR WRIT OF ATTACHMENT 
of BRP Inc's Petition for Writ of EY J. DIXON IN SUPPORT OF BRP INC. 'S PETITION FOR 
Attach ment ~T - I 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Ada ) 
I, Bradley). Dixon, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states: 
1. I am an attorney with the law firm of Stoel Rives LLP, counsel of record for 
Defendant BRP, Inc. in the above-entitled action. I make this Affidavit on my own personal 
knowledge and belief. 
2. Defendant/Cross-Claimant BRP Incorporated ("BRP") requests that this Court 
enter an order attaching the property located at 4058 Steelhead Drive, Island Park, Freemont 
County, State of Idaho (the "Property") currently owned by Kelly N. Clay for the purpose of 
securing Clay's obligation owed to BRP. In addition, BRP requests that this Court attach any 
sums realized from the conveyance by Clay of the Property. 
3. On April 23, 2007, Clay sold the Property to BRP for the amount of$30,000. 
4. Clay provided BRP with a WairantYDeed dated April 23, 2007, in which Clay 
warranted that the Property was free from claims of all persons. 
5. This Court has ruled that at the time of the sale, the title to the Property was not 
free and clear of claims of all other persons. 
6. This Court directed BRP to reconvey the Property to Clay. 
7. Following BRP's reconveyance of the Property to Clay, BRP successfully 
prosecuted a Cross Claim against Clay and was awarded damages in the amount of$31,408.96, 
attorney fees in the amount of $2,691.00 for the prosecution of the Cross Claim, attorney fees in 
the amount of $30,000.00 for the defense of the title to the Property and interest at the statutory 
rate. Clay has paid no portion of his indebtedness to BRP. 
Affidavit of Bradley J. Dixon in Support 
of BRP Inc.'s Petition for Writ of 
Attach ment 
.EY J. DIXON IN SUPPORT OF BRP INC.'S PETITION FOR 
'IT - 2 
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8. On August 6, 2009, Clay and Plaintiff Krystal M. Kinghorn ("Kinghorn") 
stipulated that Kinghorn must pay the sum of $22,235.33 on or before July 26,2010 (the 
"Payment") or Clay shall have no duty to reconvey the Property to Kinghorn. The stipulation 
makes no provision for transfer of the Payment to BRP. 
9. The debt owed by Clay to BRP is not secured by any mortgage, deed of trust, 
security interest or lien. The requested attachment is not prosecuted to hinder, delay or defraud 
any creditor of Clay. 
DA TED thi~y of June, 2010. 
~~~----
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this q ~ay of June, 2010. 
State of Idaho 
1'-;2'1-t3tJ ,0 
Affidavit of Bradley J. Dixon in Support 
of BRP Inels Petition for Writ of 
Attachment 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this~ay of June, 2010, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF BRADLEY J. DIXON IN SUPPORT OF BRP 
INC. 'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF ATTACHMENT by the method indicated below, 
addressed to the following: 
Jon J. Shindurling 
District Judge Via U.S. Mail 
BOJUleville County District Court 
605 N. Capital Avenue 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
E.W. Pike [ ] Via U.S. Mail 
Erika Lessing [.-It:-] Via Facsimile 
E.W. PIKE & ASSOCLA TES, P.A. r ] Via Overnight Mail 
151 N. Ridge Ave., Suite 210 [ ] Via Hand Delivery 
PO Box 2949 
Idaho Falls, ID 83403 
Facsimile: 208-528-6447 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Bryan D. Smith [ ] Via U.S. Mail 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES [ ~a Facsimile 
414 Shoup Avenue [ ] Via Overnjght Mail 
PO Box 50731 [ ] Via Hand Delivery 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Facsimile: 208-529-4166 
Attorney for Defendant Kelly Clay 
Affidavit of Bradley 1. Dixon in Support 
of BRP Inc.'s Petition for Writ of 
Attachment 
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T-4 
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB #4411 
Bryan N. Zollinger, Esq. - ISB #8008 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Kelly N. Clay 
FilED IN CHAMBERS 
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HONORABLE JON J. SHIN~U~lNG, 
DATE ,j\ ~oe n, ,;z(\C 
TIME 1\';,0'\ ,0 H 
DEPUTY CLERK AytH?1,", 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
KRYSTAL M. KINGHORN, flk/a 
KRYSTAL M. BARRETT, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KELLY N. CLAY, an individual, BRP 
INCORPORATED, an Idaho corporation, and 
THE BANK OF COMMERCE, an Idaho 
Banking corporation, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-07-0306 
ORDER ON STIPULATION 
IN THIS MATTER, the court having entered its Opinion, Decision, and Order on 
Motions for Summary Judgment and Defendant Clay's Motion to Strike, dated January 26,2010 
resolving the accounting between the parties and further awarding defendant Kelly N. Clay 
$22,235.33; and the parties having previously entered into a Stipulation dated August 6, 2009 
providing that "If at the end of the accounting the plaintiff owes the defendant, Kelly Clay, any 
money, the plaintiff must pay the defendant, Kelly Clay, the amount owed within six months of 
the determination of the amount owed or she agrees that the defendant, Kelly Clay, shall have no 
Order on Stipulation 
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duty to convey her the property"; and the court having determined that plaintiff, Krystal M. 
Kinghorn, flk/a Krystal M. Barrett, owes defendant, Kelly N. Clay, the sum of $22,235.33; 
NOW, THEREFORE, the Court orders that the plaintiff, Krystal M. Kinghorn, flk/a 
Krystal M. Barrett, must pay the defendant, Kelly N. Clay, the sum of $22,235.33 on or before 
July 26, 2010 or the defendant, Kelly N. Clay, shall have no duty to convey the plaintiff the 
property that is the subject of this lawsuit. 
JUDGMENT RENDERED this day of June,f~OlO. 
If) 
>age 2 
Order on Stipulation 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this U day of June, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing ORDER ON STIPULATION to be served, by placing the same in a sealed 
envelope and depositing it in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile 
transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
Alan Johnston, Esq. 
E.W. Pike & Associates 
151 N. Ridge Ave., Suite 210 
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq. 
Smith, Driscoll & Associates, PLLC 
P. O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0731 
Bradley J. Dixon, Esq. 
Samia E. McCall, Esq. 
Stoel Rives, LLP 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, 
Suite 1900 
Boise, ID 83702 
Order on Stipulation 
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[l<j u. S. Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Ovemight Deli very 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[Y] U. S. Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Deli very 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[X] u. S. Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
Clerk 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq. ISB #4411 
B.1. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB # 7010 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Defendant 
'C::Tfl:CT SEVEN COURT 





IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
KRYSTAL M. KINGHORN, flk/a 
KRYST AL M. BARRETT, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KELL Y N. CLAY, an individual, 
BRP, INCORPORATED, an Idaho 
Corporation, and THE BANK OF 




Case No. CV-07-306 
BRIEF OPPOSING PETITION FOR 
WRIT OF ATTACHMENT 
Defendant, BRP, filed a Petition For Writ Of Attachment (the "Petition") dated 
June 9,2010 along with an Affidavit Of Bradley 1. Dixon In Support OfBRP Inc.'s 
Petition For Writ Of Attachment. The Petition seeks a writ of attachment to the property 
located at 4058 Steelhead Drive, Island Park, Freemont County, State of Idaho (the 
"Property"), pursuant to I.C. § 8-501 to secure the judgment that arose from the cross 
claim of BRP against Kelly Clay. This court should deny the petition for writ of 
Brief Opposing Petition for Writ of 
Attachment 
TIT ION FOR WRIT OF ATTACHMENT - Page 1 
lings\0042 Brief Opposing Writ of Attachment.docx 
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attachment because Attorney Smith already has an attorney's fees charging lien attached 
to the Property and because BRP already has a final judgment that makes a writ of 
attachment unnecessary, or BRP could obtain a final judgment that makes a writ of 
attachment unnecessary. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD DENY THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
ATTACHMENT BECAUSE ATTORNEY SMITH ALREADY HAS AN 
ATTORNEY'S FEES CHARGING LIEN. 
This court should not grant BRP's petition for writ of attachment because 
Attorney Smith already has a charging lien in the $22,235.33 to the extent that the court 
grants Attorney Smith's motion for order to perfect attorney's fees lien in excess of 
$22,235.33. Attorney Smith also has a charging lien in the Property in first position to 
the extent the court grants an attorney's fees amount in connection with Attorney Smith's 
motion for order to perfect attorney's fees lien. Accordingly, the court should deny the 
petition for writ of attachment to the extent that Attorney Smith has a senior attorney's 
fees lien. 
III. THIS COURT SHOULD DENY THE PETITION BECAUSE BRP ALREADY 
HAS A FINAL JUDGMENT, OR IF THE JUDGMENT IS NOT YET FINAL, 
THIS COURT SHOULD ISSUE A 54(b) CERTIFICATE TO MAKE THE 
JUDGMENT FINAL. 
A writ of attachment may be used "as security for the satisfaction of any judgment 
that may be recovered." I.e. § 8-501 (emphasis added). The court "shall make a 
preliminary determination of whether there is a reasonable probability that the 
[counterclaimant] will prevail in its claim." I.C. § 8-502(e). These sections of the Code 
show that a writ of attachment is a tool to be used before a final judgment. Here, BRP 
has already received a final judgment, dated May 28, 2010. That document is even titled 
Brief Opposing Petition for Writ of 
Attachment rITION FOR WRIT OF ATTACHMENT - Page 2 
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"Final Judgment RE: Cross Claim." Accordingly, a writ of attachment is not necessary 
because presumably BRP could execute on the final judgment. 
Alternatively, if the Final Judgment RE: Cross Claim is not a final judgment that 
BRP can execute upon, then this court has the discretion to issue a 54(b) certificate of 
final judgment. LR.C.P. 54(b)(1) provides in part, 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, 
whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim, or 
when mUltiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a 
jinaljudgment upon one or more but less than all of the claims or parties 
only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay 
and upon an express direction for the entry ofthejudgment. In the absence 
of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, 
however designated, which adjudicates less than all the claims or the 
rights and liabilities of less than all the parties shall not terminate the 
actions as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of 
decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment 
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. If 
any parties to an action are entitled to judgments against each other such 
as on a claim and counterclaim, or upon cross-claims, such judgments 
shall be offset against each other and a single judgment for the difference 
between the entitlements shall be entered in favor of the party entitled to 
the larger judgment. In the event the trial court determines that a judgment 
should be certified as final under this Rule 54(b), the court shall execute a 
certificate which shall immediately follow the court's signature on the 
judgment and be in substantially the following form: [ .. .]. (emphasis 
added). 
Willis v. Larsen, 110 Idaho 818, 822 (Ct. App. 1986). 
Here, if there is no final judgment, this court should issue the 54(b) certificate to 
make it a final judgment. The litigation between BRP and Clay has concluded, and there 
no just reason for delay in obtaining a final judgment exists. BRP would then be able to 
proceed to execute upon the judgment against whatever property it locates. If this court 
does not issue a 54(b) certificate, then the court and parties will have to proceed with the 
writ of attachment requirements in LC. § 8-501 et seq. This will require extensive 
Brief Opposing Petition for Writ of 
Attachment 
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proceedings including resolving issues about lien holders (Attorney Smith's attorney's 
fees charging lien), posting a bond, and continued court oversight of the property and the 
parties. Therefore, if there is no final judgment, this court should issue a 54(b) certificate 
thereby making the judgment final and obviating the need for imposing and monitoring 
what are really prejudgment writ of attachment procedures contained in I.e. § 8-501 et 
seq. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons set forth above, this court should deny BRP's petition for a 
writ of attachment to the extent that Attorney Smith has an attorney's fees lien. 
Alternatively, should BRP have a final judgment that it can execute on or this court issue 
a 54(b) certificate making~dgment final that BRP can execute on. 
DATED this E day of July, 2010. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
Bryan D. 
Attorney for Defendant 
Brief Opposing Petition for Writ of 
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CERTIFICATE ~ SERVICE 
,<iY-
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of July, 2010, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OPPOSING PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
A TT ACHMENT to be served, by placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing 
in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or 
overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
[~.Mail 
[ ] Facsimile Transmission 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[~.Mail 
[ ] Facsimile Transmission 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
E. W. Pike 
Alan Johnston 
E. W. Pike & Associates 
151 N. Ridge Ave., Suite 210 
P.O. Box 2949 
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949 
Bradley 1. Dixon 
Samia E. McCall 
Jennifer Reinhardt 
Stoel Rives 
101 South Capitol Blvd. 
Suite 1900 
Boise, ID~.:....~8~.l..I.k--__ _ 
Brief Opposing Petition for Writ of 
Attachment [TION FOR WRIT OF ATTACHMENT - Page 5 
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB #4411 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. ISB # 7010 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Defendant 
ABBIE MACE, CLERK 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
KRYSTAL M. KINGHORN, f/k/a 
KRYSTAL M. BARRETT, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KELL Y N. CLAY, an individual, 
BRP, INCORPORATED, an Idaho 
Corporation, and THE BANK OF 
COMMERCE, an Idaho Banking 
Corporation, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-07-306 
MOTION FOR ORDER TO 
PERFECT ATTORNEY'S FEES LIEN 
COMES NOW Bryan D. Smith, Esq., of the firm Smith, Driscoll & Associates, 
PLLC, and pursuant Idaho Code § 3-205, moves this court for an order perfecting 
Attorney Bryan D. Smith's charging attorney's fee lien in the amount 0[$33,413.25 in 
the real property described in the Warranty Deed attached as Exhibit "A" to this Court's 
Order dated September 10,2009 (the "Property") and in the $22,235.33 plaintiff, Krystal 
Kinghorn, owes Kelly N. Clay. The lien will remain perfected only in whichever Kelly 
Clay has after the plaintiff chooses either to pay the defendant, Kelly Clay, the 
$22,235.33 or allow him to keep the Property. 
Vlotion for Order to Perfect Attorney's 
=ees Lien 
~R TO PERFECT ATTORNEY'S FEES LIEN - Page 1 
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This motion is made on the grounds that Attorney Bryan D. Smith has provided 
services in the amount of$33,413.25 and that Idaho Code Section 3-205 gives Attorney 
Bryan D. Smith an attorney's fee charging lien that must be perfected through court 
action. Moreover, Attorney Bryan D. Smith has recovered for defendant, Kelly N. Clay, 
either $22,235.33 or the real property described in the Warranty Deed attached as Exhibit 
"A," to this Court's Order dated September 10,2009, depending on the plaintiffs 
election to pay defendant, Kelly N. Clay, the $22,235.53 or allow him to keep the real 
property described in Exhibit "A". 
This motion is based on this Motion, the Brief In Support of the Motion For Order 
to Perfect Attorney's Fees Lien, the Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith dated July 1,2010, the 
Memorandum of Attorney's Fees, the Notice of Hearing, and the court's records and files 
in this case. 
Defendant requests oral argument. 
<jY 
DATED this / day of July, 2010. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIA TES, PLLC 
Motion for Order to Perfect Attorney's 
Fees Lien 
R TO PERFECT ATTORNEY'S FEES LIEN - Page 2 
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CERTIFICATE OJi',-SERVICE 
;;;v I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day of July, 2010, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION OR ORDER TO PERFECT ATTORNEY'S 
FEES LIEN to be served, by placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing in the 
United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight 
delivery, addressed to the following: 
[~Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
-~~ Bryan D. Smith 
Motion for Order to Perfect Attorney's 
Fees lien 
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB #4411 
B. 1. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB # 7010 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Defendant 
D1C:TR1CT SEVEN COURT 
County of Fremont State of idaho 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
KRYSTAL M. KINGHORN, f/kJa 
KR YSTAL M. BARRETT, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KELL Y N. CLAY, an individual, 
BRP, INCORPORATED, an Idaho 
Corporation, and THE BANK OF 
COMMERCE, an Idaho Banking Corporation, 
Defendants. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Case No. CV-07-306 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION 
FOR ORDER TO PERFECT 
ATTORNEY'S FEES LIEN 
In November 2005, the plaintiff, Krystal Kinghorn ("Kinghorn"), applied for a $20,000 
loan from the Bank of Commerce (the "Bank"). The Bank required that she have a cosigner on 
the loan. She approached the defendant, Kelly Clay ("Clay"), and requested that he cosign on 
the loan with her. To secure this debt, Clay had a Loan Guarantee Agreement drafted that 
Brief in 5 upport of the Motion for 
Order to Perfect Attorney's Fees Lien 
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allowed him to record a quitclaim deed on a parcel of property, described as Lot 15, Block 6, 
Buffalo River Estates Division No.2, Fremont County (the "Property") owned by Kinghorn. 
On March 2, 2007, Clay received notice that Kinghorn had missed two loan payments. 
On March 8, 2007, Clay made the payments to the Bank. On March 9, 2007, Clay recorded the 
quitclaim deed on the Property and then paid off the balance on the loan owed to the Bank. On 
April 23, 2007, Clay and BRP entered into a purchase agreement in which BRP paid Clay 
$30,000 for the Property Clay had just recorded, and Clay delivered title by warranty deed to 
BRP. 
On May 29, 2007, Kinghorn brought this suit. On August 22, 2008, following various 
motions from the parties, the court held that the transaction involving a "Loan Guarantee 
Agreement" and a quitclaim deed between Clay and Kinghorn was a mortgage, and that Clay had 
transferred the Property without first having foreclosed on the mortgage. The court found that 
Clay's transfer violated Kinghorn's right to redeem. On October 2, 2008, having changed his 
attorney and retained Attorney Bryan D. Smith, Clay filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing 
that an order for Clay to hold a foreclosure sale was the appropriate remedy rather than damages. 
In a January 12,2009 order, the court found that BRP was not a bonafide purchaser and further 
granted Clay's motion for reconsideration ordering Clay to hold a foreclosure sale. 
On August 6, 2009, Clay and Kinghorn stipulated that, rather than hold a foreclosure sale, 
the parties would treat the property as if Clay had filed a foreclosure proceeding; the parties 
agreed to perform an accounting between themselves related to the Property as if a foreclosure 
proceeding had been filed. This prevented the need to unnecessarily incur attorney's fees and 
sale costs associated with filing a foreclosure action. Clay and Kinghorn stipulated that each 
party would make motions on the accounting items that each party contended would be 
Brief in Support of the Motion for 
Order to Perfect Attorney's Fees Lien 
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awardable as if there were a foreclosure sale and that the court could rule on these accounting 
items. They also stipulated that after the court made its ruling, if Clay owed Kinghorn money, 
Clay would convey the Property and pay the amount owed within 30 days. But if Kinghorn 
owed Clay money, Kinghorn would pay that amount within six months as if she had redeemed 
the property. If Kinghorn did not pay in six months, Clay would have no duty to convey the 
Property to her. On September 10,2009, the court ordered BRP to transfer the Property to Clay. 
BRP transferred the Property to Clay on November 18, 2009. On January 26, 20 la, after the 
parties had submitted their issues pursuant to stipulation to the court, the court issued an order 
with the findings of fact necessary to effectuate the stipulation. The court found that Kinghorn 
owed $22,235.33 to Clay. On June 10,2010, the court ordered Kinghorn to pay Clay $22,235.33 
before July 26, 2010, or Clay would have no duty to convey the Property. 
Attorney Smith makes this motion pursuant to I.C. § 3-205 to perfect his attorney's fees 
charging lien by requesting an order that the lien attaches to the $22,235.33 or the Property 
because after July 26,2010, Clay will have either the Property or the $22,235.33, depending on 
Kinghorn's choice. Perfecting this lien and reducing it to an order will protect the fruits of 
Attorney Smith's labor. 
II. A TTORNEY SMITH HAS A LIEN UPON THE REAL PROPERTY AT ISSUE AND 
UPON THE $22,235.33 AWARDED TO HIS CLIENT 
An attorney's fees charging lien is created under Idaho Code § 3-205: 
The measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at 
law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties, which is not 
restrained by law. From the commencement of an action, or the service of an 
answer containing a counterclaim, the attorney who appears for a party has a lien 
upon his client's cause of action or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, 
report, decision or judgment in his client's favor and the proceeds thereof in 
whosoever hands they may come; and can not be affected by any settlement 
between the parties before or after judgment. 
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Here, Attorney Smith has complied with all the elements under section 3-205 to have a 
charging lien. By law, Attorney Smith can charge only a reasonable attorney's fees for Smith's 
legal work he and his office have provided. An action has been "commenced" because on April 
18,2007 Kinghorn filed this action with the court. See I.R.C.P. 3(a)(1) (stating that a "civil 
action is commenced by the filing of a complaint with the court" and the party filing the action is 
the "plaintiff," and the party against whom the plaintiff files the complaint is the "defendant"). 
Attorney Smith has appeared in behalf of Clay, who is a "party" in these proceedings. The 
remaining statutory requirements for the lien are further satisfied because (1) Clay has a cause of 
action against Kinghorn and BRP; and (2) this court has issued a decision or judgment in Clay's 
favor on both the $22,235.33 and return of the Property to Clay. 
Specifically, Clay has a cause of action against Kinghorn for breach of contract. Under 
the Loan Guarantee Agreement, Kinghorn was obligated to make payments to the Bank, and she 
failed to do so. Her breach gave rise to Clay's case of action for breach of contract that the 
parties resolved through the stipulation. That resolution resulted in favor of Clay with 
Kinghorn's owing $22,235.33 to Clay. Clay also has a cause of action against BRP for return of 
the property pursuant to I.e. § 55-606. When a purchaser has actual notice of a prior interest, the 
purchaser is not a bona fide purchaser. Farm Bureau Finance Co., Inc. v. Carney, 100 Idaho 
745, 748--49 (1980). When a non-bona fide purchaser takes property, the purchaser only holds 
the property title in trust for the seller. Boesigner v. Freer, 85 Idaho 551, 564 (1963). Here, 
Clay possessed title to the Property after recording the quitclaim deed. When Clay sold the 
Property to BRP (who was not a bona fide purchaser), BRP only took title in trust for Clay, who 
can sue to cancel the sale to BRP so that Clay can return the property to Kinghorn. Clay did not 
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need to sue BRP to cancel the sale because Kinghorn sued BRP, whom Clay could have and 
would have sued if Kinghorn had not done so. 
Finally, this court issued an order on September 10, 2009 ordering BRP to convey the 
Property to Clay so that Clay could hold a foreclosure sale or otherwise return the property to 
Kinghorn. This was a "decision" in favor of Clay, Attorney Smith's client; therefore, Attorney 
Smith's lien attaches to the Property, which is the proceeds of the court's decision. In addition, 
on January 26, 2010, this court ruled on the facts regarding the accounting between Kinghorn 
and Clay and ordered that Kinghorn would have to pay $22,235.33 before Clay would have a 
duty to convey the Property. This is also a "decision" in favor of Clay, Attorney Smith's client; 
therefore, Attorney Smith's lien attaches to this money. In short, Attorney Smith's lien attaches 
to the $22,235.33 or the Property, depending on Kinghorn's election. If she pays the money, the 
lien attaches to the money. If she does not pay the money, the lien attaches to the Property. 
III. THIS COURT SHOULD ISSUE AN ORDER THAT ATTORNEY SMITH'S FEES 
ARE REASONABLE THEREBY PERFECTING THE CHARGING LIEN. 
"The purpose of the attorney's lien statute is to secure payment for legal services rendered 
by allowing the attorney 'an interest in the fruits of his skill and labors. '" Jarman v. Hale, 112 
Idaho 270, 274 (Ct. App. 1986) (citing Skelton v. Spencer, 102 Idaho 69, 75 (1981». A charging 
lien "is not dependent upon possession, and is capable of adjudication and enforcement." Frazee 
v. Frazee, 104 Idaho 463, 465 (1983). An attorney need "take affirmative steps in an 
adjudicative process to perfect and reduce his lien to a judgment or order of the court." Id. at 
466. Thus, an attorney is not only required to establish the right to a lien, but also to adjudicate 
the reasonableness of the attorney's fees the client owes. Id. at 465. This court can consider the 
familiar factors in LR.C.P. 54(e) to exercises its discretion to determine that Attorney Smith's 
fees are reasonable. Sanders v. Lankford, 134 Idaho 322, 326 (Ct. App. 2000). I.R.C.P.54(e)(3) 
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Here, Attorney Smith has filed a Memorandum of Fees and accompanying affidavit that 
show the time and effort spent in recovering either the $22,235.33 or the Property for Clay. 
Novelty is a factor in this case because of the uniqueness of this case and the complicated 
remedies involved to address the contract issue, the mortgage issue, the redemptive rights issue, 
and the foreclosure issue. Attorney Smith's effort brought about an equitable remedy of holding 
a foreclosure sale and a stipulation that efficiently solved the accounting issues between Clay and 
Kinghorn. The case was "difficult" in the sense that it involved mUltiple land transfers, a 
foreclosure issue, redemptive rights issue, and because Attorney Smith litigated on two fronts for 
his client after receiving the case from another attorney. Compared to the prevailing charges for 
like work and taking into account Attorney Smith's skill and years of experience, Attorney 
Smith's fees in this case are reasonable at $175 and $185 per hour especially given that 
Kinghorn's counsel charged between $150-$175 per hour and BRP's counsel charged between 
$200-$310 per hour. The amount involved is not insignificant because the property is worth at 
least $30,000, and Attorney Smith has recovered property or $22,235.33 from Kinghorn. The 
undesirability of this case is also a factor because at the time Attorney Smith got involved the 
court had just issued an order that Clay had failed to honor Kinghorn's redemptive rights and 
Attorney Smith took the case over from anther attorney. On balance, these factors combine 
together to make a finding of $33,414.25 in attorney's fees a reasonable amount. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons set forth above, Attorney Smith respectfully requests that this court 
grant Attorney Smith's motion for order perfecting Attorney's Smith's attorney's fees lien in the 
amount of$33,414.25 as against the $22,235.33 or the Property, depending on which one Clay 
retains after Kinghorn makes her election. 
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DATED this __ 1_ day of July, 2010. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICA~r OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _1_ ~ of July, 2010, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing BRIEF SUPPORTING OBJECTION TO WRIT OF ATTACHMENT 
to be served, by placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, 
postage prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the 
following: 
[~.S.Mail 
[ ] Facsimile Transmission 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ;(U.S. Mail 
[ ] Facsimile Transmission 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
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E. W. Pike 
Alan Johnston 
E. W. Pike & Associates 
151 N. Ridge Ave., Suite 210 
P.O. Box 2949 
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949 
Bradley J. Dixon 
Samia E. McCall 
Jennifer Reinhardt 
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB #4411 
Bryan N. Zollinger, Esq. - ISB #8008 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Defendant 
county of Fremont State of Idaho 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
KRYSTAL M. KINGHORN, flk/a 
KRYSTAL M. BARRETT, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KELL Y N. CLAY, an individual, BRP 
INCORPORA TED, an Idaho corporation, and 
THE BANK OF COMMERCE, an Idaho 
Banking corporation, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV -07 -0306 
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES 
COMES NOW the defendant, Kelly N. Clay (hereafter, "Clay"), by and through counsel 
of record, Bryan D. Smith, Esq., of the firm Smith, Driscoll & Associates, PLLC, and pursuant to 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(d), and submits the following Memorandum of 
Attorney's Fees: 
1. ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
Defendant hereby claims as total attorney's fees $33,414.25 as more fully set forth in the 
Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith. 
TOTAL FEES: 
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$33,414.25 
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DATED this _1_ day of July, 2010. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLL 
Bryan D. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICAT~ OF SERVICE 
IS/, 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this L- day of July, 2010, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY'S FEES to be served, by placing 
the same in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand 
delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
Alan Johnston, Esq. [ ~ Mail 
E.W. Pike & Associates [ ] Fax 
151 N. Ridge Ave., Suite 210 [ ] Overnight Delivery 
Idaho Falls, 10 83403-2949 [ ] Hand Delivery 
Bradley 1. Dixon, Esq. 
Samia E. McCall, Esq. 
Stoel Rives, LLP 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, 
Suite 1900 
Boise, 10 83702 
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[ ] Overnight Delivery 
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB #4411 
B. 1. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB # 701 0 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
KRYSTAL M. KINGHORN, flkJa 
KRYSTAL M. BARRETT, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KELL Y N. CLAY, an individual, 
BRP, INCORPORATED, an Idaho 
Corporation, and THE BANK OF 
COMMERCE, an Idaho Banking 
Corporation, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss, 
County of Bonneville ) 
Case No. CV-07-306 
AFFIDA VIT OF BRYAN D. SMITH 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
ORDER DETERMINING 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
BRYAN D. SMITH, Esq. of the firm Smith, Driscoll & Associates, PLLC, being first 
duly sworn on oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am one of the attorneys of record for Defendant Kelly Clay in the above-
styled action. I obtained a Juris Doctorate degree from the McGeorge School of Law, at 
the University of Pacific, in 1989 and have been actively practicing law since then, 
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2. I am licensed to practice law in the Courts of Idaho, the United States 
District Court for the District of Idaho, and in the Courts of California. A substantial 
portion of my practice has been devoted to civil litigation. 
3. I submit this Affidavit in Support of Defendant's Motion to Determine 
Attorney's Fees. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" are true and accurate time itemizations 
generated by my office for work performed on this case. My time entries are identified 
as BDS entries. Bryan N. Zollinger's time entries are identified as BNZ. Bryninn T. 
Erickson's time entries are identified as BTE. 
5. My rate of billing on the above-referenced matter started at $175 per hour 
and increased to $185.00 per hour effective January 1,2009. I believe that this hourly 
rate is reasonable, especially given the amount involved and the result obtained, the 
desirability of the case, the nature and length of my professional relationship with my 
client, awards in similar cases, my experience (particularly in the area of law involved in 
this case), and the rates charged by other attorneys with comparable experience in 
comparable cases in the southeastern Idaho area. 
6. The rate of billing on the above-referenced matter for my associate 
attorney, Bryan N. Zollinger, is $120.00 per hour. I believe that this hourly rate is 
reasonable, especially given the amount involved and the result obtained, the desirability 
of the case, awards in similar cases, his experience (particularly in the area of law 
involved in this case), and the rates charged by other associate attorneys with comparable 
experience in comparable cases in the southeastern Idaho area. 
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8. The rate of billing on the above-referenced matter for my legal clerk, 
Bryninn T. Erickson, is $85.00 per hour. Bryninn is a graduate from the University of 
Idaho Law School and is currently studying for the Idaho bar exam. I believe that his 
hourly rate is reasonable in light of his experience (particularly in the area of law 
involved in this case), and the rates charged by other legal clerks with comparable 
experience in comparable cases in the southeastern Idaho area. 
9. The attorney's fees as set forth in this affidavit were and are necessarily 
and actually incurred in this action. 
Further sayeth YOU~aUght. 
DATED this L day of July, 2010. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
-'1'---
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Sy 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the / day of July, 2010, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF BRYAN D. SMITH IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DETERMINE ATTORNEY'S FEES to be served by placing the same 
in a sealed envelope and depositing it in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or by 
hand delivery, facsimile transmission, or overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
[ ~ Mail E. W. Pike 
[ ] Facsimile Transmission Alan Johnston 
[ ] Overnight Delivery E. W. Pike & Associates 
[ ] Hand Delivery 151 N. Ridge Ave., Suite 210 
P.O. Box 2949 
[~Mail 
[ ] Facsimile Transmission 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949 
Bradley J. Dixon 
Samia E. McCall 
Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith in Support 
of Motion for Order Determining 
Attorney's Fees 
;MITH IN SUPPORT OF MOnON FOR ORDER DETERMINING 
) Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith in Support of Motion for Order Determining Attorneys 
Page 265 
Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith in Support 
of Motion for Order Determining 
Attorney's Fees 
Page 266 
EXHIBIT "A " 
Sn .1, Driscoll & Associates, LC 
Invoice submitted to: 
Kelly Clay 
4470 North 25th East 
Idaho Falls 1083401 
June 30, 2010 
In Reference To: Krystal Barrett 
Professional Services 
8/22/2008 - BOS Meet with Kelly Clay; 
8/29/2008 - BOS Meet with Mark Fuller 
414 Shoup Avenue 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, 10 83405 
TIN: 82-0518512 
(208) 524-0731 
9/4/2008 - BOS Research regarding paying or tendering purchase price; 
9/8/2008 - BOS Telephone conference with client; telephone conference with 
Jennifer Reinhardt; 
9/10/2008 - BOS Telephone conference with Mark Fuller (Kelly Clay); receipt and 
review of substitution of counsel, letter from Mark Fuller, opinion, 
decision, and order on parties' motions for summary judgment, 
order regarding setting pretrial conference and jury trial, amended 
notice of deposition duces tecum of Brett Whitaker, stipulation to 
amend scheduling order, amended disclosure of expert witnesses, 
affidavit of Krystal Kinghorn in support of motion for partial 
summary judgment, and appraisals received 9/3/2008 from Mark 
Fuller; 
9/11/2008 - BOS Research regarding redemption and exercising redemptive rights; 
memo to file; telephone conference with Mark Fuller; attendance at 
deposition of Brett Whitaker; 
- BNZ Receipt and review Opinion, Decision and Order on Parties' 
Motions for Summary Judgment; Research Idaho statutes and case 
law regarding I.C. Section 11-402. 
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9/12/2008 - BNZ Research Idaho case law on right of redemption requirements; 
research Idaho redemption statutes and case law; research 
Redemption statutes and case law; Research tender payments; 
9/15/2008 - BNZ Research case law right of redemption and statutory procedures in 
other states; draft motion for reconsideration and brief in support of 
motion for consideration; 
9/16/2008 - BNZ Draft brief in support of motion for reconsideration; research case 
law on what constitutes tender when complying with statutory 
process of redemption rights; 
9/18/2008 - BDS Receipt and review of pretrial order; calendar last days; telephone 
conferences with Jennifer Reihnardt; telephone conference with 
client; 
- BNZ Research redemption rights; read Kinghorn deposition; draft brief in 
support of motion for reconsideratioin; research applicable law; 
9/19/2008 - BNZ Receipt and review of file; review pleadings and discovery 
contained in file; 
9/22/2008 - BDS Telephone conference with Alan Johnston; receipt and review of 
invoice, letters, and transcript of Brett Whitaker received 9/19/2008; 
receipt and review of motion for leave of court to file and 
amendment to the amended complaint and amendment to the 
complaint received 9/22/2008 from Alan Johnston; consideration of 
filing motion for summary judgment; 
- BNZ Review depositions of Kelly Clay, Krystal Kinghorn and Margie 
Fereday; review procedural history and read motions and 
supporting briefs; research equitable mortgages and sufficiency of 
tender; 
9/23/2008 - BDS Letter to client; 
- BNZ Research statutory procedure for exercising redemption rights; 
draft motion for summary judgment; draft brief in support of motion 
for summary judgment; 
9/24/2008 - BNZ Draft Brief in support of motion for summary judgment; draft Brief in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment; draft brief in support of 
motion for summary judgment; 
9/25/2008 - BNZ Draft brief in support of summary judgment; draft motion for 
summary judgment and reconsideration; draft brief in support of 
summary judgment and reconsideration; 
- BDS Receipt and review of letter and addendum received 9/25/2008 
from John Terrill; consideration of further handling for summary 
judgment; 
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9/26/2008 - BDS Revise affidavits of Doyle Beck and Kelly Clay; 
- BNZ Draft affidavits for Kelly Clay and Doyle Beck; 
- BNZ Draft Motion for Summary Judgment and brief in support; 
9/29/2008 - BDS Review and revise motion, brief, and affidavit of Bryan O. Smith in 
support of motion for reconsideration or alternatively summary 
judgment; 
BNZ Draft Affidavit of Bryan Smith; Review and modify brief in support of 
motion for reconsideration; 
9/30/2008 - BDS Telephone conference with client; revise brief in support of motion 
for reconsiderationlsummary judgment; 
10/3/2008 - BDS Letter to client; 
10/6/2008 - BDS Receipt and review of brief in support of motion for partial summary 
judgment, motion for partial summary judgment, notice of hearing, 
and affidavit of Krytstal Kinghorn received 10/6/2008; 
1017/2008 - BDS Letter to client; 
10/8/2008 BDS Receipt and review of letter from Brad Dixon received 10108/08; 
telephone conference with Brad Dixon; 
10/20/2008 - BDS Receipt and review of plaintiffs memorandum in opposition to 
defendant Clay's motion for reconsideration or alternatively 
summary judgment received 10/20/2008 from Alan Johnston; 
consideration of further handling; receipt and review of affidavit of 
Krystal Kinghon in objection to Clay's moton for reconsideration or 
in the laternative summary judgment and affidavit of Margie 
Fereday in objection to Clay's motion for reconsideration or in the 
alternative summary judgment received 10/20/2008 from Alan 
Johnston; receipt and review of BRP's second cross motin for 
summary judgment, affidavit of Jennifer Reihhardt, and 
memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs second motion for 
summary judgment and in support of BRP's second cross motion 
for summary judgment received 10/20/2008 from Jennifer 
Reinhardt; 
10/21/2008 - BOS Letter to client; 
Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith in Support 











































10/21/2008 - BNZ Receipt and review of Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant Kelly 
Clay's Motion for Reconsideration; Research case law regarding 
futility of tender; Research statutory law on effect of compliance 
with foreclosure procedures; 
10/22/2008 - BNZ Research case law on failure to comply with statutory foreclosure 
procedures; Draft reply brief to plaintiffs memorandum in 
opposition to motion for reconsideration; 
10/23/2008 - BDS Consideration of brief in reply to plaintiffs opposition to defendant's 
motion for summary judgment; receipt and review of notice of 
hearing on BRP's second cross motion for summary judgment 
received 10/22/2008 from Jennifer Reinhardt; 
- BNZ Draft Reply to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Objection to Motion for 
Reconsideration; Research case law in support of reply brief; 
10/24/2008 - BNZ Draft Reply Brief to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Motion 
for Reconsideration or Alternatively Summary Judgment; Review 
Expert Witness Disclosures; Research case law in support of 
Reply brief; 
- BDS Receipt and review of brief opposing Clay's motion for summary 
judgment received 10/24/2008; preparation of brief in reply to 
opposition brief; 
10/2712008 - BDS Preparation of reply brief; 
- BNZ Draft Reply Brief to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Motion 
for Reconsideration or Alternatively Motion for Summary Judgment; 
10/28/2008 - BDS Receipt and review of BRP's response to plaintiffs motion to file 
amendment to amended complaint received 10/27/2008 from Brad 
Dixon; receipt and review of plaintiffs reply memorandum in 
support of second motion for summary judgment and in opposition 
to BRP's second cross motion for summary judgment received 
10/28/2008; telephone conference with JRS; receipt and review of 
depositions of Margie Fereday, Kelly Clay, Mark Fuller, Krystal 
Kinghorn, and Doyle Beck received 9/3/2008 from Mark Fuller; 
receipt and review of deposition of Brett Whitaker received 
9/19/2008 from John Terrill; letter to client; 
11/3/2008 BDS Preparation for hearing on motion for reconsideration and summary 
judgment; attendance at hearing; 
11/4/2008 - BNZ Telephone expert witness Monty Egbert; 
11/5/2008 - BNZ Telephone conversation with Monty Egbert regarding his status as 
an expert witness; 
Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith in Support 






























1116/2008 - BOS Receipt and review of minute entry on motion hearing received 
11/5/2008; 
11/7/2008 - BOS Receipt and review of order granting plaintiff's motion to amend the 
amended complaint received 11/7/2008; letter to client; letter to 
client; 
11/1412008 - BOS Telephone conference with client; 
11/1712008 - BOS Receipt and review of BRP's second set of requests for production 
of documents and notice of service to Kinghorn received 
11/1712008 from Bradley Dixon; 
11/18/2008 - BOS Receipt and review of plaintiff's supplemental memorandum 
received 11/18/2008 from Alan Johnston; letter to client; 
12/2312008 - BOS Receipt and review of plaintiffs answers to BRP's second set of 
interrogatories to plaintiff Krystal Barrett received 12/19/2008 from 
Ted Pike; 
1/12/2009 - BOS Attendance at hearing on pretrial conference; telephone 
conferences with client; consideration of further handling; 
1/13/2009 - BOS Receipt and review of opinion, decision and order on plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment and defendant Clay's motion to 
reconsider received 1/12/2009; 
1/14/2009 - BOS Receipt and review of notice of time for status conference and 
minute entry on pretrial conference received 1/13/2008; 
1/19/2009 - BOS Letter to client; receipt and review of letter from Jennifer Reinhardt 
received 1/16/2009; letter to client; 
1/21/2009 - BOS Receipt and review of opinion, decision and order on plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment and defendant Clay's motion to 
reconsider received 1/12/2009; receipt and review of email from 
Jennifer Reinhardt received 1/12/2009; receipt and review of fax 
from Marilyn Sommer received 1/14/2009; research regarding 
statute of limitations for claim; review file and prepare spreadsheet 
for damage calculations; review deed of trust; telephone 
conference with Bank of Commerce; telephone conference with 
client; telephone conference with Alan Johnston; letter to client; 
telephone conference with client; 
1/22/2009 - BOS Telephone conference with Jennifer Reinhart; 
1/27/2009 - BOS Receipt and review of affidavit of Alan Johnston and motion for 
attorney's fees and costs from Alan Johnston; telephone 
conference with Alan Johnston; consideration of further handling; 
Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith in Support 
































2/2/2009 - BNZ Research I.C. 12-121 and related case law; 
2/3/2009 - BNZ Research segregation of fees case law; 
2/4/2009 - BOS Telephone conference with client; 
- BNZ Draft Objection to Motion for Award of Fees and Costs; 
2/5/2009 - BOS Preparation of objection to motion for attorney's fees and costs; 
- BNZ Complete Objection to Motion for Fees and Costs; 
2/9/2009 - BOS Letter to client; 
2/12/2009 - BOS Receipt and review of memorandum in support of motion for award 
of attorney's fees and costs and reply to Clay's objection and letter 
from Alan Johnston received 2/11/2009; letter to client; 
2/14/2009 - BOS Receipt and review of BRP's objection to plaintiffs motion for award 
of attorney's fees and costs received 2/13/2009; 
3/20/2009 - BOS Telephone conferences with client; research and determine amount 
of credit plaintiff owes Clay for bank payments, tax payments, and 
other payments; prepare spreadsheet; telephone conference with 
Alan Johnston; letter to Alan Johnston; 
3/26/2009 - BNZ Research reciprocity of contractual provision for parties attorney's 
fees; 
3/27/2009 - BNZ Research case law regarding joint and several liability for attorney 
fees; draft brief in support of objection to attorney's fees 
3/30/2009 - BOS Telephone conference with Alan Johnston; telephone conference 
with client; telephone conference with court clerk; 
- BNZ Draft brief in support of objection to attorney's fees; 
3/31/2009 - BOS Telephone conference with court clerk; telephone conference with 
client; telephone conference with Jennifer Reinhart; participation in 
telephonic status conference with court; 
- BNZ Research case law regarding joint and several liability for attorney 
fees; draft brief in support of objection to attorney's fees; 
Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith in Support 






































4/21/2009 - BOS Telephone conference with Fremont County treasurer; preparation 
of stipulation; 
4/22/2009 - BOS Letter to Alan Johnston; 
5/1/2009 - BOS Telephone conference with Alan Johnston; 
5/4/2009 - BOS Receipt and review of fax from Sheryl Gillogly; 
5/11/2009 - BOS Attendance at telephonic status conference hearing; telephone 
conference with Alan Johnston; 
5/18/2009 - BOS Receipt and review of minute entry on status conference received 
5/15/2009; receipt and review of letter from Alan Johnston received 
5/18/2009; telephone call to Alan Johnston's office; 
6/312009 - BNZ Preparation of brief in support of objection to memorandum for 
attorney fees and costs; 
6/4/2009 - BNZ Preparation of brief in support of objection to memorandum for 
attorney's fees and costs; 
6/24/2009 - BNZ Preparation of brief in support of objection to memorandum for 
attorney's fees and costs; 
6/25/2009 - BNZ Preparation of brief in support of objection to memorandum for 
attorney's fees and costs; 
6/29/2009 - BOS Telephone conference with Alan Johnston; 
7/1/2009 - 80S Revise stipulation; 
7/2/2009 - BOS Revise stipulation; letter to Alan Johnston; 
7/24/2009 - BOS Receipt and review of letter from Allan Johnson; 
8/4/2009 - BOS Letter to Alan Johnston; 
8/7/2009 - BOS Receipt and review of letter and signed stipulation from Alan 
Johnston received 8/7/2009; letter to Alan Johnston; letter to client; 
8/24/2009 - BOS Attendance at status conference hearing; 
Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith in Support 








































8/25/2009 - BOS Memo to file; 
8/26/2009 - BOS Receipt and review of minute entry received 8/25/2009; meet with 
BNZ to discuss further handling; letter to client; 
- BNZ Prepare brief in support of motion for summary judgment; 
8/27/2009 - BOS Preparation of brief opposing motion for attorney's fees; preparation 
of order; 
8/28/2009 - BNZ Research foreclosure statutes and case law regarding costs and 
fees; 
9/3/2009 - BOS Telephone conference with Jennifer Reinhardt; 
9/4/2009 - BOS Letter to Judge Shindurling; 
9/8/2009 - BNZ Research case law regarding costs and fees associated with 
mortgage foreclosure; 
9/10/2009 - BNZ Research non-judicial foreclosure procedures; 
9/11/2009 - BOS Receipt and review of order from court; 
9/14/2009 - BOS Letter to client; 
9/16/2009 - BNZ Research subpoenas; 
9/17/2009 - BNZ Research foreclosure procedures, costs and fees; 
9/18/2009 - BNZ Prepare motion for summary judgment; prepare brief in support of 
motion for summary judgment; 
9/22/2009 - BNZ Research contractual attorney's fee cases and unjust enrichment; 
Prepare brief in support of motion for summary judgment; 
9/23/2009 - BNZ Prepare brief in support of motion for summary judgment; 
9/25/2009 - BOS Receipt and review of BRP's cross claim against Kelly Clay for 
breach of the warranty deed received 9/22/2009 from Bradley Dixon; 
Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith in Support 








































9/28/2009 - BOS Preparation of motion and brief in support of motion for summary 
judgment; letter to client; preparation of reply to cross claim; 
- BNZ Prepare brief in support of motion for summary judgment; 
9/29/2009 - BOS Letter to client; preparation of motion, brief, and affidavit of Bryan 
O. Smith in support of motion for summary judgment; 
- BNZ Prepare affidavit in support of motion for summary judgment; 
prepare spreadsheet with interest calculations; 
9/30/2009 - BNZ Preparation of affidavit of BOS; preparation of motion for summary 
judgment; preparation of brief in support of motion for summary 
judgment; preparation of spreadsheet with interest calculations; 
10/1/2009 - BOS Preparation of brief in support of motion for summary judgment; 
preparation of brief in opposition to motion for award of attorney's 
fees and costs; 
10/5/2009 - BNZ Preparation of brief in support of objection to motion for award of 
attorney's fees; preparation of affidavit of Bryan O. Smith; 
10/9/2009 - BOS Preparation of notice of hearing; letter to client; 
10/20/2009 - BOS Receipt and review of memorandum, brief, and affidavit of Doyle 
Beck in support of motion for summary judgment regarding BRP's 
cross claim against Kelly Clay for breach of the warranty deed 
received 10/19/2009 from Jennifer Reinhardt; telephone 
conference with Brad Dixon; letter to client; preparation of 
nonopposition brief; telephone conference with client; 
10/23/2009 - BOS Preparation of notice of hearing; receipt and review of notice of 
hearing from BRP on its motion for summary judgment received 
10/23/2009 from Jennifer Reinhardt; 
10/26/2009 - BOS Preparation of amended notice of hearing; 
10/27/2009 - BOS Letter to client; 
11/3/2009 - BOS Receipt and review of amended notice of hearing regarding BRP's 
motion for summary judgment regarding cross claim against Kelly 
Clay for breach of the warranty deed received 11/2/2009 from 
Jennifer Reinhardt; 
11/4/2009 - BNZ Receipt and review plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment, 
affidavit of Brett Whitaker, and plaintiff's memorandum in support of 
plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment and response in 
opposition to defendant Kelly Clay's motion for summary judgment; 
Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith in Support 

















































11/5/2009 - BOS Receipt and review of plaintiffs cross motion for summary 
judgment, affidavit of Bret Whitaker, and plaintiffs memorandum in 
support of plaintiffs cross motion for summary judgment and 
response in opposition to defendant Kelly Clay's motion for 
summary judgment received 10/27/2008; consideration of further 
handling; 
11/17/2009 - BOS Telephone conference with Alan Johnston; letter to Jennifer 
Reinhardt: 
11/18/2009 - BOS Receipt and review of letter and quitclaim deed from Brad Dixon 
received 11/18/2009; 
11120/2009 - BOS Letter to client; 
- BNZ Prepare reply brief in support of motion for summary judgment; 
11/21/2009 - BNZ Prepare reply brief in support of motion for summary judgment; 
11/27/2009 BNZ Research issue of raising issues for the first time in summary 
judgment; research undisclosed expert witness testimony; prepare 
reply to plaintiffs counter motion for summary judgment; 
11/30/2009 - BNZ Prepare objection to plaintiffs cross-motion for summary judgment 
and reply brief in support of motion for summary judgment; 
12/112009 - BNZ Research evidentiary and procedural rules regarding expert 
testimony; prepare affidavit of Bryan N. Zollinger; prepare motion to 
strike expert witness' affidavit; prepare brief in support of motion to 
strike expert witness' affidavit; 
12/2/2009 - BOS Preparation of brief in reply to plaintiffs brief in opposition to 
summary judgment; preparation of brief in support of defendant's 
motion to strike; 
- BNZ Prepare objection to plaintiffs cross-motion for summary judgment 
and reply brief in support of motion for summary judgment; prepare 
affidavit of Bryan N. Zollinger; prepare motion to strike expert 
witness' affidavit; prepare brief in support of motion to strike expert 
witness' affidavit; 
12/4/2009 - BOS Receipt and review of tax notice received 12/3/2009; 
12/8/2009 - BOS Preparation for hearing on cross motions for summary judgment; 
attendance at hearing on cross motions for summary judgment; 
12/10/2009 - BOS Receipt and review of minute entry received 12/912009; telephone 
conference with client; letter to client; 
Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith in Support 

















































1/25/2010 - BDS Receipt and review of invoice from Buffalo River Water Association 
received 1/25/2010; 
1/27/2010 - BDS Receipt and review of opinion, decision, and order on motions for 
summary judgment and defendant Clay's motion to strike received 
1/27/2010; telephone conference with client; letter to Alan Johnston; 
1/28/2010 - BDS Letter to client; 
1/29/2010 - BDS Receipt and review of fax from Jennifer Reinhardt received 
1/29/2010; follow up with Jennifer Reinhardt; 
2/1/2010 - BDS Telephone conference with Jennifer Reinhardt; 
2/9/2010 - BDS Consideration of motion for Rule 54(b) certificate; preparation of 
order on stipulation; 
2/10/2010 - BDS Letter to Alan Johnston; 
2/23/2010 - BDS Telephone conference with Alan Johnston; receipt and review of 
petition for fees and costs, memorandum in support of petition for 
fees and costs, affidavit of Bradley Dixon in support of petition for 
fees and costs, affidavit of Bradley Dixon regarding amounts due 
on judgment received 2/23/2010; 
2/24/2010 - BDS Letter to client; 
2/25/2010 - BNZ Preparation of motion to disallow costs and fees; 
2/27/2010 - BNZ Research case law regarding commercial transactions under 
12-120(3); preparation of brief in support of motion to disallow fees 
and costs; 
3/4/2010 - BNZ Research case law regarding definition of commercial transaction; 
review of affidavit of Bradley J. Dixon regarding: amounts due on 
judgment; preparation of motion for disallowance of costs and fees 
and objection to affidavit of Bradley J. Dixon regarding amounts 
due on judgment; preparation of brief in support of motion to 
disallow costs and fees; 
3/5/2010 - BOS Preparation of motion to disallow costs and fees and objection to 
request for amounts due on judgment and brief in support of motion 
to disallow costs and fees and objection to request for amounts due 
on judgment; 
Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith in Support 
































3/5/2010 - BNZ Preparation of motion for disallowance of costs and fees and 
objection to affidavit of Bradley J. Dixon regarding amounts due on 
judgment; preparation of brief in support of motion to disallow costs 
and fees; 
3/8/2010 - BOS Telephone conference with Jim Herndon; telephone conference 
with client; 
3/16/2010 - BOS Preparation of notice of hearing; 
3/20/2010 - BOS Receipt and review of BRP's memorandum in opposition to Kelly 
Clay's motion to disallow costs and fees and objection to request 
for amounts due on judgment and affidavit of Bradley J. Dixon 
received 3/15/2010; memo to file; 
3/22/2010 - BOS Letter to client; telephone conference with Jim Herndon; 
- BNZ Receipt and review BRP's memorandum in opposition to Kelly 
Clay's Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees; receipt and review 
Affidavit of Bradley J. Dixon in support of opposition; review cases 
law cited in memorandum; 
3/23/2010 - BNZ Research case law regarding commercial transactions as defined 
in I.C. 12-120(3); preparation of reply brief in support of motion to 
disallow costs and fees;; 
3/24/2010 - BNZ Preparation of reply brief in support of motion to disallow costs and 
fees;; 
3/25/2010 - BNZ Preparation of reply brief in support of motion to disallow costs and 
fees; 
- BOS Preparation of reply brief in support of motion to disallow costs; 
3/30/2010 - BOS Attendance at hearing on motion to disallow and objection; 
research regarding tender of defense rule before recovering 
litigation costs; 
3/31/2010 - BOS Receipt and review of motion for leave of court to file a second 
amendment to the amended complaint and second amendment to 
the amended complaint received 3/30/2010 from Alan Johnston; 
4/112010 - BOS Receipt and review of minute entry received 3/31/2020; 
- BNZ Research tender of defense doctrine; preparation of supplemental 
brief in support of motion to disallow costs and fees; 
Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith in Support 

















































4/2/2010 - BNZ Preparation of supplemental brief in support of motion to disallow 
costs and fees; 
- BDS Preparation of supplemental brief on motion to disallow attorney's 
fees and costs; letter to client; 
4/6/2010 - BDS Receipt and review of BRP's response to supplemental brief in 
support of motion to disallow costs and fees and objection to 
request for amounts due on judgment received 4/6/2010 from 
Bradley Dixon; 
4/21/2010 - BDS Receipt and review of letter and BRP's opposition to plainitffs 
motion for leave to file second amended complaint received 
4/12/2010 from Jennifer Reinhardt; 
5/312010 - BDS Receipt and reveiw of Buffalo River Water Association, Inc. 
statement received 4/30/2010; letter to Alan Johnston; 
5/6/2010 - BDS Receipt and review of opinion, decision, and order on Clay's motion 
to disallow costs and fees and objection to request for amounts due 
on judgment received 5/5/2020; letter to client; 
5/28/2010 - BDS Receipt and review of letter and proposed final judgment regarding 
cross claim received 5/27/2010 from Brad Dixon; email to Brad 
Dixon regarding objecting to proposed judgment; receipt and review 
of email from Brad Dixon; 
6/112010 - BDS Letter to court; preparation of application for order on stipulation; 
preparation of order on stipulation; 
6/2/2010 - BDS Receipt and review of letter and proposed amended judgment 
received 6/2/2010 from Brad Dixon; 
6/3/2010 - BDS Letter to client; telephone conference with client; 
6/9/2010 - BDS Receipt and review of petition for writ of attachment, affidavit of 
Bradley J. Dixon, letter, and proposed writ of attachment received 
6/9/2010 from Bradley Dixon; telephone conference with Bradley 
Dixon; consideration of further handling; 
6/10/2010 - BDS Receipt and review of amended final judgment regarding cross 
claim received 6/10/2010; letter to client; preparation of notice of 
hearing; consideration of filing motion to perfect attorney's fee lien; 
- BTE Research lien caselaw; review file; 
6/11/2010 - BDS Letter to client; letter to client; preparation of motion, brief and 
affidavit in opposition to motion for writ of attachment; 
Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith in Support 

















































6/11/2010 - BTE Preparation of motion for lien; preparation of affidavit of BOS; 
preparation of objection to writ; preparation of brief supporting 
objection; 
6/15/2010 - BOS Receipt and review of order on stipulation received 6/14/2010; letter 
to client; 
- BTE Research claims for brief for perfection of lien; 
6/17/2010 - BTE Preparation of motion to perfect lien; research lien perfection and 
cause of action caselaw; 
6/18/2010 - BTE Preparation of brief in support of motion to perfect attorney's fee 
lien; 
6/19/2010 - BOS Preparation of motion for order to perfect attorney's fees lien; 
preparation of brief in support of motion to perfect attorney's fees 
lien; 
6/21/2010 - BOS Preparation of brief and motion in support of attorney's fees lien; 
- BTE Preparation of brief for fees lien; research mortgage and bona fide 
purchaser caselaw; review case file; 
6/22/2010 - BTE Preparation of brief for fees lien; research rescission claim; 
preparation of brief for fees lien; 
6/23/2010 - BTE Preparation of brief for fees lien; preparation of brief objecting to 
writ of attachment; 
6/24/2010 - BOS Preparation of motion for order to perfect attorney's fees lien and 
brief in support of motion for order to perfect attorney's fees lien; 
6/28/2010 - BTE Preparation of brief for fees lien; 
6/29/2010 - BOS Preparation of brief in support of motion for attorney's fees lien; 
preparation of brief opposition writ of attachment; 
- BTE Preparation of brief opposing writ of attachment; 
6/30/2010 - BOS Preparation of brief in support of motion for attorney's fees lien; 
preparation of objection to petition for writ of attachment; 
7/19/2010 - BOS Preparation of brief in reply to BRP's opposition to motion for 
attorney's fees lien; 
7/26/2010 - BOS Attendance on hearing at motion for attorney's fees lien and petition 
for writ of attachment; 
Affidavit of Bryan 0 Sm,'th' 5 
. In upport 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
KRYSTAL M. KINGHORN, f/k/a 
KRYSTAL M. BARRETT, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KELLY N. CLAY, an individual, 
BRP, INCORPORATED, an Idaho 
Corporation, and THE BANK OF 
COMMERCE, an Idaho Banking Corporation, 
Defendants. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Case No. CV-07-306 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OPPOSING 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
ATTACHMENT 
Defendant, BRP, filed a Petition For Writ Of Attachment (the "Petition") dated June 9, 
2010, along with an Affidavit Of Bradley 1. Dixon In Support Of BRP Inc. 's Petition For Writ 
Of Attachment. The Petition seeks a writ of attachment to the property located at 4058 Steelhead 
Drive, Island Park, Freemont County, State of Idaho (the "Property"), pursuant to I.e. § 8-501 
attempting to secure the judgment that arose on the cross claim of BRP against Kelly Clay. This 
Supplemental Brief Opposing Petition i' OPPOSING PETITION FOR WRIT OF ATTACHMENT-
for Writ of Attachment 
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court cannot issue a writ of attachment because BRP has not brought an action upon a judgment 
or upon a contract for the direct payment of money. 
u. THIS COURT SHOULD DENY THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF ATTACHMENT 
BECAUSE A WRIT OF ATTACHMENT CANNOT BE ISSUED WITHOUT AN 
ACTION UPON A CONTRACT FOR DIRECT PAYMENT OF MONEY OR A FINAL 
JUDGMENT. 
I.e. § 8-502 states: 
(a) A plaintiff desiring the issuance of a writ of attachment shall file with 
the court an application therefore supported by an affidavit made by or on behalf 
of the plaintiff setting forth: 
1. That the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff (specifying the amount of 
such indebtedness over and above all legal setoffs or counterclaims) and whether 
upon ajudgment or upon a contractfor the direct payment of money, ... 
(emphasis added) 
The statute thus requires that the attachment may issue in an action upon a judgment or upon a 
contract for the direct payment of money. Ross v. Gold Ridge Min. Co., 14 Idaho 687, 95 P. 821, 
822 (1908). "If the complaint discloses that it is not such an action, and an attachment is issued, 
then it was improperly issued, and upon proper motion will be dissolved." Ross, 95 P. at 822. 
Here, Clay is not indebted to BRP upon a contract for the direct payment of money. 
BRP's cross claim is for a breach of warranty deed that involved in a land sale contract on April 
23,2007. The warranty deed and land sale contract are for the conveyance of real property to 
BRP, not for the direct payment of money to BRP. 
Nor is Clay indebted to BRP upon a judgment. The court has not issued a final judgment 
as discussed in the Brief Opposing Petition For Writ Of Attachment, dated July 1, 2010. 
Moreover, the complaint must disclose liability on a judgment or a contract for the payment of 
money, and BRP's cross-claim does not assert liability on a judgment. Thus, this court cannot 
grant the writ of attachment because BRP has not brought an action of the kind that § 8-502 
reqUires. 
Supplemental Brief Opposing Petition 
for Writ of Attachment 
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III. CONCLUSION 
Thus, for the reasons set forth above, this court should deny BRP's petition for a writ of 
attachment. 
DATED this -/r--""-- day of July, 2010. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
By: 
Bryan D. Smith 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICA~ SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~'~a~2010, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OPPOSING PETITION FOR WRIT OF ATTACHMENT to 
be served, by placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, 
postage prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the 
following: 
[~ail 
[ ~acsimile Transmission 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[~ 
[ +--Facsimile Transmission 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
( J Hand Delivery 
E. W. Pike 
Alan Johnston 
E. W. Pike & Associates 
151 N. Ridge Ave., Suite 210 
P.O. Box 2949 
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949 
Bradley J. Dixon 
Samia E. McCall 
Jennifer Reinhardt 
Stoel Rives 
101 South Capitol Blvd. 
Suite 1900 
Boise, ID 83702 . 
Bryan D. Smith 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 









Plaintiff, Case No. CV -2007-306 
-VS.- MINUTE ENTRY FILED IN CHAMBERS 
AT IDAHO FALLS 
KELL Y CLAY, et al, BONNEVILLE COUNTY 
HONORABLE JON J. SH1NDURlING 
~~J~ ~v\t\;7Tb1&a = 
DEPUTY CLERK llL., hU"4.!i 
Defendants. 
On July 19,2010, a Petition for Writ of Attachment came on for hearing before the 
Honorable Jon 1. Shindurling, District Judge, sitting in open court at Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Ms. Nancy Marlow, Court Reporter, and Ms. Grace Walters, Deputy Court Clerk, were 
present. 
Mr. John Stosich appeared on behalf of the plaintiff. 
Mr. Bryan Smith appeared on behalf of the defendant, Kelly Clay. Mr. Brad Dixon 
appeared on behalf of the defendant, BRP. 
Mr. Stosich presented a blank check for $22,235.33 for redemption of the property. 
Mr. Dixon presented argument on the Petition for the Writ of Attachment. Mr. Clay did 
not satisfy the elements to succeed in this case. The Court may direct who the check should go 
to, as there is a final judgment in this case. 
The Court stated the check should be deposited with the Clerk in Fremont County and 
then the funds directed from there. 
MINUTE ENTRY - 1 
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Mr. Smith argued in opposition to the Petition for Writ and the statute is inapplicable as 
the statute applies to prejudgment writs. Mr. Smith stated there is a stipulation in which the 
money is to be paid to his client. Mr. Smith argued on the Motion for to perfect attorney fees. 
Mr. Dixon rebutted the arguments made and reinforced his position on the Petition for 
Writ. 
The Court will authorize Mr. Stosich to tender the redemption fee to the Clerk of the 
Court in Fremont County until the Court decides who gets the fund. The Deed will be executed 
so that Ms. Kinghorn gets title to the property. 
Mr. Smith requested the Court looks at the June 10, 2009 order. 
The Court will take the matter under advisement. 
Court was thus adjourned. 
c: John Stosich 
Bryan Smith 
Brad Dixon 
MINUTE ENTRY - 2 
IINDURLING 
District Judge 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
KRYSTAL M. KINGHORN, flk/a 
KRYSTAL M. BARRETT, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KELLY N. CLAY, an individual, BRP, 
INCORPORA TED, an Idaho corporation, 
and THE BANK OF COMMERCE, an 
Idaho Banking corporation, 
Defendants. 




KELL Y N. CLAY, an individual, 
Cross-defendant. 
Case No. CV -07-0306 
OPINION, DECISION, AND ORDER 
ON ATTORNEY BRIAN SMITH'S 
MOTION TO PERFECT ATTORNEY'S 
FEES LIEN 
filED IN CHAMBERS 
AT IDAHO fAllS 
BONNEVIllE COUNTY 
HONORABLE JON J. SHlNDURLlNG 
DATE Septewter I 20i..D 
TIME 'j ;!;tS PM I 
DEPUTY ClERK~t1jl PO;' 1& hc.tP:, 
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This case has a long history that is well-documented in earlier orders. In summation, 
Kinghorn was in financial duress and asked Clay to co-sign a $20,000 loan and deed of trust on 
her property located in Fremont County. He agreed, and in December 2005 Kinghorn executed 
the bank loan documents, including a quit claim deed. 
In March 2007, after Kinghorn had missed two payments, Clay made payment on the 
loan and recorded the quit claim deed on the property. Clay paid off the remaining balance of the 
loan and sold the property to BRP. 
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In May 2007, Kinghorn filed suit against Clay and BRP. In August 2008, this court found 
that Clay had violated Kinghorn's right to redemption. In January 2009, this court entered 
summary judgment against BRP, finding that it was not a bona fide purchaser. In January 2010, 
this court entered summary judgment against Clay for failing to defend BRP's claim under the 
warranty deed. 
The end result of Kinghorn's suit was for this court to unwind the transaction. Kinghorn 
and Clay stipulated to Kinghorn repaying Clay the balance on the loan in return for Clay 
delivering title on the property. 
As a result of BRP's claims against Clay, this court has ordered Clay to pay BRP 
$31,408.96 for the unwound transaction and $32,691.00 in fees and costs related to defending the 
lawsuit. 
On June 10,2010, BRP filed a petition for writ of attachment on the property. On July 6, 
2010, Brian Smith, attorney for Clay, filed this motion to perfect his attorney's fees lien on 
Clay's proceeds from the unwinding of the sale. 
Following responsive briefing, those matters came up for hearing on July 19, 2010. At 
that time, Kinghorn tendered payment on the property and the court instructed Kinghorn's 
attorney to deposit the check with the clerk of Fremont County, pending the determination of 
these motions. The court and counsel agreed that, as a result of Kinghorn depositing the check, 
BRP's petition for writ of attachment was no longer necessary and that the only remaining issue 
to consider was whether Smith's lien took priority over BRP's judgment. At that time the court 
took this matter under advisement. 
After considering the Court's file, pleadings, depositions, admissions, affidavits, and the 
argument of counsel, the Court renders the following opinion. 
Opinion, Decision & Order on Attorney 
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II. ANALYSIS 
A. Attorney's Lien 
Brian Smith, attorney for Clay, seeks to perfect his attorney's lien on the proceeds of the 
redemption check from Kinghorn. Smith bases his argument on I.e. § 3-205, which states: 
The measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left 
to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties, which is not restrained by 
law. From the commencement of an action, or the service of an answer containing 
a counterclaim, the attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon his client's 
cause of action or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report, decision or 
judgment in his client's favor and the proceeds thereof in whosoever hands they 
may come; and can not be affected by any settlement between the parties before 
or after judgment. 
Smith acknowledges that Idaho does not recognize a common law right to attorney's 
liens. 
BRP argues that because Smith never formally commenced an action on behalf of Clay, 
he does not have a legitimate lien on the proceeds under I.C. § 3-205. Smith argues that he could 
have filed a counterclaim against Kinghorn, but did not do so because he reached an agreement 
with Kinghorn and her attorney for her to tender the redemption payment. Smith argues that 
requiring attorneys to file unnecessary claims in order to preserve their liens violates both public 
policy and common sense. 
Though this court is sympathetic to Smith's policy argument, the Court of Appeals has 
ruled to the contrary in a similar situation, Kenneth F White, Chtd. v. St. Alphonsus Regional 
Medical Center, 136 Idaho 238, 31 P.3d 926 (Ct.App. 2001). In White, the attorney for an 
injured client secured a settlement on his client's behalf, without filing a lawsuit. White perfected 
his attorney's lien under I.C. § 3-205, and the hospital that treated his client appealed, arguing 
that the portion of the statute that reads "[fJrom the commencement of an action, or the service of 
Opinion, Decision & Order on Attorney 
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an answer containing a counterclaim" must be read literally. The Court of Appeals sided with the 
hospital: 
St. Alphonsus argues that no attorney's lien can arise unless a lawsuit has been 
initiated by the attorney against the wrongdoer on behalf of the injured person. In 
the present case, White negotiated a settlement with Kent and Kent's liability 
insurer without having filed a lawsuit. For that reason, St. Alphonsus argues, no 
attorney's lien arose. 
We agree. Unambiguous language in a statute must be given force according to its 
plain meaning by courts applying the statute unless clearly expressed legislative 
intent is contrary or unless plain meaning leads to absurd results. 
White, 136 Idaho at 241,31 P.3d at 929. 
The court then held that "[t]he plain language of I.C. § 45-701' makes the 
commencement of an action or service of a counterclaim a prerequisite for the creation of an 
attorney's charging lien." Id. 
The Court of Appeals then went on to address the policy concerns involved with this 
interpretation: 
While the fairness of this limitation might be debated, it cannot be said that it 
leads to an absurd result. Rational reasons for the requirement can be readily 
discerned. If a wrongdoer does not tender compensation to an injured person until 
after a lawsuit has been filed, it is likely that the services of the injured person's 
attorney were instrumental in achieving the payment. On the other hand, where 
the wrongdoer capitulates and settles before any action is filed, the significance of 
the attorney's services is in much greater doubt; it might as readily be assumed 
that the wrongdoer intended to provide compensation all along and that the 
attorney had little, if anything, to do with inducing the settlement. The legislature 
thus limited the availability of an attorney's charging lien to circumstances where 
the value of the attorney's service is more clearly demonstrated. 
Id. 
I The citation to I.e. § 45-701 is a clerical error. That section governs a hospital's right to a lien and does not relate 
to the court's discussion in this section of the opinion. Judging from the context of the opinion the court meant to 
Opinion, Decision & Order on Attorney 
Brian Smith's Motion to Perfect 
Attorney's Fees Lien 
DER ON MOTION TO PERFECT ATTORNEY'S LIEN - 4-
Page 290 
It is undisputed that Smith never commenced an action or filed a counterclaim on behalf 
of Clay against Kinghorn. Under White, and the plain language of I.e. § 3-205, Smith does not 
have an attorney's lien on Clay's proceeds from Kinghorn's redemption check. 
B. Disbursement of Proceeds 
As Smith is not entitled to a lien on the proceeds under I.C. § 3-205, the check from 
Kinghorn should be delivered directly to BRP to cover, in part, its judgment against Clay. 
The clerk of Fremont County shall release the deposited funds to BRP. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore, it is hereby ordered that the clerk of Fremont County release to BRP, Inc. the 
$22,235.33 deposited by Krystal Kinghorn. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. r 
I~ 
Dated this -I- day of September, 2010. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this day of September, 2010, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing OPINION, DECISION, AND ORDER ON SMITH'S MOTION TO PERFECT 
ATTORNEY'S LIEN upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct postage thereon, 
or by causing the same to be delivered to their courthouse boxes. 
Attorney for Plaintiff Kinghorn 
Alan Johnston 
E. W. Pike & Associates 
151 N. Ridge Ave., Suite 210 
PO Box 2949 
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949 
Attorneys for Defendant Clay 
Bryan D. Smith 
McGrath Meacham 
410 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Attorneys for Defendant/Crossclaimant BRP 
Bradley J. Dixon 
Samia E. McCall 
Jennifer Reinhardt 
Stoel Rives 
101 South Capitol Blvd. 
Suite 1900 
Boise, ID 83702 
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by 
Clerk of the District Court 
Fremont County, Idaho 
Deputy Clerk 
. ON MOTION TO PERFECT ATTORNEY'S LIEN - 6 -
Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB #4411 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB # 7010 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Defendant 
D ~~E~N~~=---~ 
Cc'unty of Fremont State of Idaho 
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KELL Y N. CLAY, an individual, 
BRP, INCORPORATED, an Idaho 
Corporation, and THE BANK OF 
COMMERCE, an Idaho Banking Corporation, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-07-306 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: KRYSTAL M. KINGHORN, flk/a KRYSTAL M. BARRETT, PlaintifflRespondent, 
and ALAN JOHNSTON, HER ATTORNEY OF RECORD; BRP, 
INCORPORATED, DefendantJCrosscIaimantJRespondent, and BRADLEY J. 
DIXON, SAMIA E. McCALL, and JENNIFER REINHARDT, ATTORNEYS FOR 
BRP; THE BANK OF COMMERCE, and DOUGLAS R. NELSON, ATTORNEY 
FOR THE BANK OF COMMERCE; and TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE· 
ENTITLED COURT; 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. Counsel for the above-named defendant, Bryan D. Smith, Esq. of Smith Driscoll 
& Associates, PLLC ("Smith") appeals to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Seventh Judicial 
District Court's Order entered September 1, 2010 in the above-entitled action against Smith and 
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Page 293 
ge 1 
.\0044 Notice of Appeal.docx 
in favor of the above-named defendants/respondents, the Honorable Ion 1. Shindurling, District 
Judge, presiding. 
2. Smith has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment 
described in paragraph one above is subject to appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule II(a). 
3. The issue which Smith intends to assert on appeal is the following: Did the 
district court commit reversible error in determining that Kelly Clay needed to commence an 
action in order for Smith to have an attorney's charging lien for the legal work performed in an 
action that was already commenced? 
4. Idaho Appellate Rule 11 provides that Smith has the right to appeal the above-
identified Order to the Supreme Court. 
5. Smith requests the inclusion of the following documents comprising the Standard 
Record under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules: 
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a. Register of actions; 
b. The original and any amended complaint; 
c. The original and any amended answer or response to the complaint; 
d. The original and any amended counterclaim, third party claim, or cross-
claim; 
e. The original and any amended answer or response to a counterclaim; 
f. The findings of fact and conclusions of law and any memorandum 
decision the court entered; 
g. All judgments and decrees; 
h. Notice of appeal and cross-appeal; 
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6. Smith requests the following documents be included in the clerk's record in 
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate Rules: 
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a. Opinion, Decision, and Order on Parties' Motions for Summary Judgment 
dated August 22, 2008; 
b. Motion for Reconsideration or Alternatively Summary Judgment dated 
October 2, 2008; 
c. Opinion, Decision, and Order on Plaintiff s Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Defendant Clay's Motion to Reconsider dated January 12,2009; 
d. Stipulation dated August 7, 2009; 
e. Order dated September 10, 2009; 
f. Motion for Summary Judgment dated October 9,2009; 
g. Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment dated October 9, 2009; 
h. Final Judgment RE: Cross Claim dated May 28, 2010; 
1. Petition for Writ of Attachment dated June 9,2010; 
J. Affidavit of Bradley J. Dixon in Support of BRP INC. 's Petition for Writ 
of Attachment dated June 9, 2010; 
k. Proposed Writ of Attachment dated June 9,2010; 
1. Order on Stipulation dated June 10,2010. 
m. Brief Opposing Petition for Writ of Attachment dated July 1,2010; 
n. Motion for Order to Perfect Attorney's Fees Lien dated July 1,2010; 
o. Brief in Support of the Motion for Order to Perfect Attorney's Fees Lien; 
p. Memorandum of Attorney's Fees dated July 1,2010; 
age 3 
s\0044 Notice of Appcal.docx 
q. Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith in Support of Motion for Order Determining 
Attorney's Fees dated July 1,2010; 
r. Supplemental Brief Opposing Petition for Writ of Attachment dated July 
15,2010; 
s. Minute Entry dated July 19, 2010; and 
1. Opinion, Decision, and Order on Attorney Brian Smith's Motion to 
Perfect Attorney's Fees Lien dated September 1, 2010; 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of 
whom a transcript has been requested; 
(b) That the reporter who reported the trial before the district court and from 
whom a transcript has been requested has been paid the estimated fee for preparation of 
the reporter's transcripts; 
(c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid; 
(d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid; and 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Idaho Appellate Rule 20. 
DATED this :J.- vl:!:;;f Septemher, 2010. 
Notice of Appeal 
Page 296 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
By: 
Bryan 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ::L <.£!~September, 2010, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served, by placing the same in a 
sealed envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand delivery, 
facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
E. W. Pike [ ~Mail 
Alan Johnston [ ] Fax 
E. W. Pike & Associates [ ] Overnight Delivery 
151 N. Ridge Ave., Suite 210 [ ] Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 2949 
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949 
Bradley 1. Dixon 
Samia E. McCall 
Jennifer Reinhardt 
Stoel Rives 
10 1 South Capitol Blvd. 
Suite 1900 
Boise, ID 83702 
Douglas R. Nelson 
Anderson Nelson Hall Smith, P.A. 
Post Office Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
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[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
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[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Deli very 
[ ] Hand Deli very 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB #4411 
Bryan N. Zollinger, Esq. - ISB #8008 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.o.. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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THE STATE o.F IDAHO., IN AND Fo.R THE Co.UNTY OF FREMONT 
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KR YSTAL M. BARRETT, 
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v. 
KELLY N. CLAY, an individual, BRP 
INCo.RPORATED, an Idaho corporation, and 
THE BANK o.F COlviMERCE, an Idaho 
Banking corporation, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-07-0306 
RULE 54 (b) CERTIFICATE 
Based on the September 1, 2010 Opinion, Decision, and Order on Attorney Bryan 
D.Smith's Motion to Perfect Attorney's Fees Lien, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 
AND DECREED that Attorney Bryan D. Smith is not allowed an attorney's fees lien under I.e. 
§ 3-205 on Kinghorn's payment to the court in the amount of $22,235.33. 
DATED: IW/fil tl ,2010 : 
Rule 54(b) Certificate 
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H Jon J. Shindurling 
RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE 
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment or order it is hereby 
CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P., that the Court has determined that there is 
no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the Court has and does hereby 
direct that the above judgment or order dated September 1, 2010 shall be a final judgment upon 
which execution may issue and an appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate 
Rules. 
Dated this '1( day of ~ 2010. 
Rule S4(b) Certificate 
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB #4411 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB # 7010 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
KRYSTAL M. KINGHORN, f/k/a 
KRYSTAL M. BARRETT, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KELL Y N. CLAY, an individual, 
BRP, INCORPORATED, an Idaho 
Corporation, and THE BANK 0 F 
COMMERCE, an Idaho Banking Corporation, 
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AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: KRYST AL M. KINGHORN, f/k/a KRYSTAL M. BARRETT, PlaintifflRespondent, 
and ALAN JOHNSTON, HER ATTORNEY OF RECORD; BRP, 
INCORPORATED, Defendant/Crossclaimant/Respondent, and BRADLEY J. 
DIXON, SAMIA E. McCALL, and JENNIFER REINHARDT, ATTORNEYS FOR 
BRP; THE BANK OF COMMERCE, and DOUGLAS R. NELSON, ATTORNEY 
FOR THE BANK OF COMMERCE; and TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-
ENTITLED COURT; 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. Counsel for the above-named defendant, Bryan D. Smith, Esq. of Smith Driscoll 
& Associates, PLLC ("Smith") appeals to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Seventh Judicial 
District Court's Opinion, Decision, And Order On Attorney Bryan Smith's Motion To Perfect 
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Attorney's Fees Lien against Smith and in favor of the above-named defendantslrespondents 
entered September 1, 2010 and the Rule 54(b) certifieate dated October 25, 2010 in the above-
entitled action, the Honorable Jon 1. Shindurling, District Judge, presiding. 
2. Smith has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment 
described in paragraph one above is subject to appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule Il(a). 
3. The issue which Smith intends to assert on appeal is the following: Did the 
district court commit reversible error in determining that Kelly Clay needed to commence an 
action in order for Smith to have an attorney's charging lien for the legal work performed in an 
action that was already commenced? 
4. Idaho Appellate Rule 11 provides that Smith has the right to appeal the above-
identified Order to the Supreme Court. 
5. Smith requests the inclusion of the following documents comprising the Standard 
Record under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules: 
a. Register of actions; 
b. The original and any amended complaint; 
c. The original and any amended answer or response to the complaint; 
d. The original and any amended counterclaim, third party claim, or cross-
claim; 
e. The original and any amended answer or response to a counterclaim; 
f. The findings of fact and conclusions of law and any memorandum 
decision the court entered; 




All judgments and decrees; 
Notice of appeal and cross-appeal; 
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6. Smith requests the following documents be included in the clerk's record in 
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate Rules: 
a. Opinion, Decision, and Order on Parties' Motions for Summary Judgment 
dated August 22, 2008; 
b. Motion for Reconsideration or Alternatively Summary Judgment dated 
October 2, 2008; 
c. Opinion, Decision, and Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Defendant Clay's Motion to Reconsider dated January 12,2009; 
d. Stipulation dated August 7, 2009; 
e. Order dated September 10, 2009; 
f. Motion for Summary Judgment dated October 9, 2009; 
g. Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment dated October 9, 2009; 
h. Final Judgment RE: Cross Claim dated May 28,2010; 
1. Petition for Writ of Attachment dated June 9, 2010; 
J. Affidavit of Bradley J. Dixon in Support of BRP INC. 's Petition for Writ 
of Attachment dated June 9, 2010; 
k. Proposed Writ of Attachment dated June 9, 2010; 
1. Order on Stipulation dated June 10,2010. 
m. Brief Opposing Petition for Writ of Attachment dated July 1, 2010; 
n. Motion for Order to Perfect Attorney's Fees Lien dated July 1,2010; 
o. Brief in Support of the Motion for Order to Perfect Attorney's Fees Lien 
dated July 1,2010; 
p. 
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Memorandum of Attorney's Fees dated July 1,2010; 
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q. Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith in Support of Motion for Order Determining 
Attorney's Fees dated July 1,2010; 
r. Supplemental Brief Opposing Petition for Writ of Attachment dated july 
15,2010; 
s. Minute Entry dated July 19,2010; 
t. Opinion, Decision, and Order on Attorney Brian Smith's Motion to 
Perfect Attorney's Fees Lien dated September 1, 2010; and 
u. Rule 54(b) Certificate dated October 25, 2010. 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of 
whom a transcript has been requested; 
(b) That the reporter who reported the trial before the district court and from 
whom a transcript has been requested has been paid the estimated fee for preparation of 
the reporter's transcripts; 
(c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid; 
(d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid; and 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Idaho Appellate R~ 
DATED this 2.56 day of October, 2010. 
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~~ Bryan D. 11th 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICAT~RVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this Eday of October, 2010, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served, by placing the same in 
a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand delivery, 
facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
E. W. Pike 
Alan Johnston 
E. W. Pike & Associates 
151 N. Ridge Ave., Suite 210 
P.O. Box 2949 
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949 
Bradley J. Dixon 
Samia E. McCall 
Jennifer Reinhardt 
Stoel Rives 
101 South Capitol Blvd. 
Suite 1900 
Boise, ID 83702 
Douglas R. Nelson 
Anderson Nelson Hall Smith, P.A. 
Post Office Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Krystal M. Kinghorn 
f/k/a Krystal M. Barrett 
vs 
Kelly N. Clay, an individual 
Plaintiff(s)/Respondent(s) 




Bank of Commerce 
Defendant/Respondent 
Supreme Court No. 38109 
Case No. CV2007-306 
I, Becky Harrigfeld, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for Fremont County, do hereby certify that I have personally served or mailed, 
by United States mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the Clerk's Record to each of the parties or their 
Attorney of Record as follows: 
Attorney 
For Appellant 
Bryan D. Smith 
414 Shoup Avenue 
PO Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, 1083405 
Attorney 
For Respondent 
Alan F. Johnston 
PO Box 2949 
Idaho Falls, 10 83403 
Bradley J. Dixon 
101 South Capitol Blvd., Suite 1900 
Boise, 1083702-5958 
Douglas R. Nelson 
PO Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, 1083405-1630 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court this 7th day 
of January, 2011. 
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Bank of Commerce 
Defendant/Respondent 
Supreme Court No. 38109 
Case No. CV2007-306 
I, Abbie Mace, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Fremont, do hereby certify that the above and 
foregoing Record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my 
direction and is a true, full and correct Record of the pleadings and documents under 
Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
I do further certify that all documents, x-rays, charts and pictures offered or 
admitted in the above-entitled cause will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme 
Court along with the Court Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said 
Court at St. Anthony, Fremont, Idaho, this 7th day of January, 2011. 




District Court Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR FREMONT COUNTY 
Krystal M. Kinghorn 
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vs 
Plaintiff(s)/Respondent(s) 
Kelly N. Clay, an individual 
Defendant/Crossdefendant/ Appellant 
BRP, Incorporated 
Defen da nt/ Crosscla ima nt/Respondent 
And 
Bank of Commerce 
Defendant/Respondent 
Supreme Court No. 38109 
Case No. CV2007-306 
Affidavit of 
Becky Harrigfeld 
I, Becky Harrigfeld, Deputy Clerk for Fremont County, make the following 
statement regarding the Amended Notice of Appeal, filed October 29, 2010, by Bryan 
D. Smith, Attorney for Defendant/Crossdefendant/ Appellant. 
The amended notice requests the addition of certain documents be added to the 
Clerk's Record on Appeal, one of these documents requested, see: paragraph 6, item (k) 
Proposed Writ of Attachment dated June 9,2010, is not in the file and after diligent 
search I have been unable to locate this document. It is not an entry on the Register of 
Action in the IStars computer program used by this Court. 
The court received one copy of the transcript and Mr. Smiths' office provided 
two copies that were sent along with the clerks' record to the respondent attorneys. 
I MAKE THIS STATEMENT and attest that it is true to the best of my knowledge 
this 7 January 2011. 
Affidavit of Becky Harrigfeld 
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